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Dynamic Governance Innovation 
 
by  
 
Elizabeth Burleson* 
 
Abstract: This article frames environmentally sound innovation in the context of transnational 
network theory with the goal of setting forth a preliminary framework for international legal 
policy coherence. I consider how network dynamics can facilitate broad diffusion of 
environmentally sound technologies, concluding that what appears to be fragmented trade, 
environment, and human rights regimes are indeed sustainable development building blocks with 
which to achieve dynamic governance. Collaborative environmentally sound innovation 
networking may be able to shepherd whole renewable energy sectors across the innovation valley 
of death and help turn a global responsibility to ramp up green technology into a global initiative 
to do so.  
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 I. Introduction  
 
 Dynamic network governance can help coordinate interdisciplinary, inter-sectoral, 
and transboundary cooperation to balance the protection of property rights with access to 
environmentally sound, socially sensitive technology innovations. In particular, networks 
can consider policy coherence (sensible coordination and integration) among human 	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rights, environmental and economic arenas. International institutions are often networks 
in their own right and have the capacity to bring stakeholders together to address 
governance gaps and conflicts. For instance, closing the climate mitigation gap in an 
affordable, environmentally sound way likely involves coordinating strategies among 
mitigation, adaptation, development, and disaster risk reduction in a manner that is 
mutually reinforcing. 
 The open question is how green technology networking can play a role in 
innovation and diffusion to address climate change. Knowledge sharing can help realize 
co-benefits from addressing climate and human security. In the new geography of 
technology governance, the International Energy Association warns that in the energy 
efficiency sector, “significant underinvestment remains, resulting from an array of market 
financial, information, institutional and technical barriers.”1 Reducing trade barriers 
against energy-efficient and renewable technologies can be a strategic means of closing 
the climate mitigation gap.2 At the same time, innovation-centric networking remains a 
critical and still under-theorized area of scholarship. My central thesis is that networks 
can play a catalytic role in coordinating environmentally sound technology innovation 
and diffusion.  
 In Section II, I set out the theoretical underpinnings of my analysis through a law 
and economics frame of transnational network theory applied to address environmentally 
sound technology (EST) market failures. 
 Section III of this Article analyzes three legal approaches to addressing EST 
market failure: (1) a freestanding instrument, (2) WTO jurisprudence regarding infant 
renewable industry subsidies, and (3) climate technology network coordination. This 
Article recommends that transnational intra-network policy coordination can help map 
economic, social, and environmental gaps and conflicts. Moreover, networks can help 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 OECD/IEA 2011 CLEAN ENERGY PROGRESS REPORT, OECD and IEA, available at 
http://iea.org/Textbase/npsum/CEM_Progress_ReportSUM.pdf. See also UNITED NATIONS 
SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY, RESILIENT PEOPLE 
RESILIENT PLANET: A FUTURE WORTH CHOOSING 4 (2011) available at 
http://www.un.org/gsp/sites/default/files/attachments/GSPReportOverview_Letter%20size.pdf. 
(noting that drivers include “unsustainable lifestyles, production and consumption patterns and 
the impact of population growth. As the global population grows from 7 billion to almost 9 
billion by 2040, and the number of middle-class consumers increases by 3 billion over the next 20 
years, the demand for resources will rise exponentially. By 2030, the world will need at least 50 
per cent more food, 45 per cent more energy and 30 per cent more water — all at a time when 
environmental boundaries are throwing up new limits to supply.”) Id. See also Mark Muro, Letha 
Tawney and Alex Trembeth, BEYOND BOOM AND BUST: GETTING CLEAN ENERGY POLICY 
RIGHT, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2012) available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/0418_clean_investments/0418_clean_in
vestments_final%20paper_PDF.pdf (“In the absence of significant and timely energy policy 
reform, the recent boom in US clean tech sectors could falter.”) Id.  
 2 The IPCC indicates that atmospheric CO2 levels were above 390 ppm (39% beyond 
preindustrial concentrations) at the close of 2010, see ZERO ORDER DRAFT SPECIAL REPORT 
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES (SRREN) SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (2011) IPCC, 
available at http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/srren-spm-fd4 (Renewable energy can “contribute to 
social and economic development, energy access, a secure energy supply, and reducing negative 
impacts on the environment and health.”) Id. 
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coordinate policy coherence on such challenges as public support for infant renewable 
innovation and diffusion consistent with fair trade. Environmentally sound innovation 
and diffusion could benefit from both innovation networking and a freestanding 
instrument that coordinates trade, intellectual property, environmental, and human rights 
law.  
 The new Climate Technology Center and Network can go beyond the capacity of 
international economic law by coordinating public-private breakout EST cooperation. 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Certification for green building 
provides a private certification catalytic approach with which to nest networks within 
networks to share best practices for environmentally sound innovation and diffusion. 
Section IV makes the case for EST innovation and diffusion to least developed countries.  
 Economic network effects can enhance EST innovation. The nascent technology 
network can help coordinate a reciprocal trade-environment measure that clarifies trade 
regime support. In particular, the technology network can be catalytic in incentivizing 
environmentally sound energy innovation and diffusion to least developed countries. 
 In this Article, I offer a theory on how to move closer to international cooperation 
through transnational network coordination. Intra-network coordination at the local, 
national, and international levels can help clarify challenges and build consensus on 
policy responses. In doing so, I provide a preliminary approach moving away from 
international legal fragmentation to policy coherence on environmentally sound 
innovation and diffusion.  
 
 
II. Law and Economics: Transnational Network Theory  
 
 In order to develop my central thesis that networks can play a catalytic role in 
coordinating environmentally sound technology innovation and diffusion, I first set out 
the theoretical underpinnings of my analysis.	   
 
 
A. Methodology 
 
 This Article applies the economic network effects theory to environmentally 
sound innovation sharing. In doing so, it draws upon the literature of good governance 
theory, trade, sustainability, adaptive management, intersystemic governance, 
transgovernmental networks, the dynamic school and multiscalar governance networks.3 
These interrelated governance theories are woven together with economic game theory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 3 e.g. J.B. RUHL, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND THE STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 363, available at 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/docs/ssrn-id1517374.pdf (“Transgovernmental Network theory 
emphasizes the nonhierarchical horizontal and vertical networks that are built among the officials 
of those national and international institutions to exchange information, identify best practices, 
harmonize approaches, and enforce the overall international policy program. The movement 
toward Dynamic Federalism and New Governance at domestic, federal and state scales portends 
the same conditions that are giving rise to such networks in international contexts.”) Id. at 363. 
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and climate collective action.4 I rely upon synergies among competing rights frames. 
These include intellectual property rights, human rights, and environmental sustainability. 
 I analyze optimal scales of regulation, often called matching in the US and tied to 
the related notion of subsidiarity in Europe. Mindful of global legal pluralism, I argue 
that innovation cooperation can build upon lessons learned from property law with regard 
to intellectual property rights and the closing of commons. This analysis draws upon the 
observations of Coase, Nash, Sen, Dworkin, Ostrom, and Sax in its exploration of 
normative law and economics. It also draws upon Koh, Janis, and the London School of 
Economics tradition of bridging economic theory and progressive international legal 
reform.5  
 
 
B. Network Theory 
 
 Public-­‐private	  network	  coordination	  can	  enhance	  the	  sharing	  of	  renewable	  energy	  and	  efficiency	  solutions. A body of economic “network effect” literature has 
built upon Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro ’s work on the ramping up of dominant 
standards via network activity.6 Collaborative public sector and non-governmental 
organization networks, when representative and transparent, can increase in stature and 
legitimacy through their involvement in inclusive decision-making.  
 While “private power is still no substitute for state power,” NGO networks can 
shape policy discourse by proposing recommendations and frameworks.  In this context, 
Reiser and Kelly have highlighted the need for NGO accountability to ensure 
international legal legitimacy.7 A decision-making process increases in stature and 
legitimacy when it involves representative, transparent, non-governmental networks that 
are able to flesh out frameworks. The downside is that such inclusive decision-making 
can take more time and require more resources than decision-making that is less inclusive.  
 Cho and Kelly argue that the power of “networks results from the intra-network 
dynamics they foster and the end products that they develop.”8 Recognizing networks as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 4 c.f. Mark Dawson, Three Waves of New Governance in the European Union, E.L. REV. 
2011, 36(2), 208-225, 210 (2011) (“We have legal effects (governance) but not legal 
responsibility (a set of rules or actors that can be checked to see if, in fact, the correct plan of 
action is being carried out”) Id. 
 5 Harold Koh, The American Tradition of International Law Great Expectations 1789-
1914, 21 Conn. J. Int'l L. 191, 191 (2006) (highlighting the universalist international law 
scholarship of Mark W. Janis as the United States leans away from international legal solutions to 
pressing global problems. Koh explains that “[t]he American universalist tradition represents a 
commitment to fundamental justice, international legal process, transnationalism, and human 
rights. It can be contrasted to positivism, which views international law not as natural law, but as 
a construct of manmade law. . . ”); see e.g. Mark W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of 
International Law, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 61 (1984) (Discussing treaties with non-state actors).  
 6 Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985). 
 7 see Dana Brakman Reiser and Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the 
Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOKLYN J. INTL. L. 1001, 1014-15 (2011). 
 8 Sungjoon Cho and Claire R. Kelly, PROMISES AND PERILS OF NEW GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: A CASE OF THE G20, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 491, 505 (2012). 
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processes, Cho and Kelly argue that G20 financial crisis coordination provides a 
transgovernmental regulatory network model for timely regulatory response.9 While the 
jury may still be out on that, a more general proposition is that network-generated 
norms10 can sometimes lessen decision-making inertia. Yet, when collaborative 
governance involves civil society networks in inclusive decision-making, it is important 
to be mindful of legitimacy (both of the overall governance approach and of given civil 
society network participants.) 
 Governments that are representative are generally seen as more legitimate than 
those that are not. Non-governmental entities may be more representative than their 
governments in some contexts and less so in others. Irrespective of the degree to which 
governments model good governance, non-state actor networks that seek involvement in 
decision-making should maximize good governance principles.11 By doing so such non-
governmental entities can better facilitate policy coordination because their own policy 
generation process will be less likely to be scrutinized on procedural grounds. This 
collaboration then leaves an open space with which to find common ground on 
substantive concerns that have brought these entities together. Stakeholders may all want 
the same outcome – a stable climate but also have distinct and at times seemingly 
irreconcilable interests that can be seen as too reliant upon market forces or, in contrast, 
too reliant upon a well-resourced public sector. Similarly, distrust arises when plans 
appear paternalistic or colonial. Technological complexity may not match local 
community capacity, but developing country communities are adept at such analyses 
because knowledge is shared in a culturally sensitive manner. 
 Civil society is not by definition legitimate or illegitimate in the context of 
network norm generation. Networks themselves are neither innately good nor bad. They 
can be useful in coordinating complex international cooperation or work to oversimplify 
policy coherence in a direction favoring a vested interest.12  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 9 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton 2004) (discussing 
norm-building by government networks); see also David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in 
International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 563, 576 (2008) (discussing the role of 
networks in international administrative law); see also Cho and Kelly, supra note 8 at 491, 
(discussing the role of the G20 as a transgovernmental regulatory networks (TRNs) in the context 
of the financial crisis) citing Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and 
International Policy Coordination, 46 INTL. ORG. 1, 2 (1992) and Keohane and Joseph Nye, 
Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD. POL. 39, 61 (1974); 
see also INECE, CHAPTER TWELVE, TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS 384, available at 
http://inece.org/mlw/Chapter12_TransgovernmentalNetworks.pdf. 
 10 c.f. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 
YALE J. INTL. L. 113, 114 (2009) (“In recent years, scholars of global governance have devoted 
substantial attention to the promise and perils of... regulatory networks (TRNs).”) Id. 
 11 UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, WHAT IS GOOD GOVERNANCE? available at 
http://www.unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm. 
 12 Cho and Kelly, supra note 8 at 507-508 (When shared vision, trust and complementary 
expertise can overcome gridlock to act collectively, valuable advice and mediation capacity can 
be gained through working within nested networks. At worst networks may engage in coercion. 
The dynamics at play in a given intra-network engagement can affect the effectiveness and 
perceived legitimacy of the process. Who should be at the table? International innovation 
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 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration calls for greater public participation in 
environmental decision-making.13 This principle has been codified in the Aarhus 
Convention Human Right to a Clean Environment and network norm generating 
initiatives to expand the principle to a global, or at least series of regionally binding 
instruments, are underway – most recently in the context of Rio+20.14 Consequently, 
access to information, public participation, and access to justice are gaining widespread 
credence as core aspects of good governance.15 In the context of EST innovation and 
diffusion, interactions between transnational (private) networks and transgovernmental 
(public) regulatory networks include dynamic climate negotiation participation in which 
private networks act as counterparts to public networks in government, international 
institution, and non-state actor network interactions. Network-generated norms16 ebb and 
flow in such inter-active forums as the climate negotiations and can alternately 
exacerbate gridlock and create openings for break out consensus building. 
 Even when networks consist of public civil servants rather than non-state actors, 
legitimacy questions still arise with regard to whether there is a need for elected 
officials.17 If representation involves actually reflecting a pluralistic international 
community, then broad involvement of a wide array of stakeholders arguably provides a 
model for EST governance.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cooperation can involve research/ education institutions, companies, international institutions, 
governments, and NGOs.  Given this array of stakeholders, network generated rules, norms, and 
standards may end up representing best practice prototypes or a race to the bottom proposals. 
Public sector capacity should be robust enough to weigh competing guidance from non-state actor 
networks.)  
 13 Rio Declaration Principle 10 (1992) available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 
(Principle 10 states that “Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all 
concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities  
 In their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. 
States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information 
widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress 
and remedy, shall be provided.”) Id. 
 14 Rio on Principle 10 supra note 13; see also CIEL Submission to Rio+20 (2011), CIEL 
available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/567CIEL%20rio%202012%20comments.pdf 
(“One particular sectoral element of the green economy that Rio+20 could consider is the use of 
technology to promote innovation in the developed world . . . Rio+20 could contribute to the 
beneficial use of technologies for sustainable development by identifying and supporting options 
beyond intellectual property rights to spur innovation.”) Id. 	   15	  e. g. Oliver A. Houck, TAKING BACK EDEN: EIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL CASES THAT 
CHANGED THE WORLD (Island Press: 2010).	  
 16 See Margaret Chon, PPPs in Global IP (Forthcoming) manuscript on file with author 
(discussing normative plasticity in NGO driven PPP network processes.); c.f. Verdier, supra note 
10. 
 17 Cho and Kelly, supra note 8 at 557. 
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C. Bringing Climate Technology Networking Into Focus 
 
 UNFCCC Technology Mechanism coordination does not innately confer 
legitimacy but lends credence to the working of a broad intra-network EST initiative. 
That said, the emerging technology mechanism is vulnerable to capture. Consequently, 
the international community should prioritize defining “environmentally sound” 
technology based, for instance, on the Agenda 21 Chapter 34 definition:  
 
Environmentally sound technologies protect the environment, are less 
polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of 
their wastes and products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable 
manner than the technologies for which they were substitutes.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 18 U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs Div. for Sustainable Dev., AGENDA 21: Earth 
Summit–The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio (Apr. 1993), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter34.htm.  
 Agenda 21, Chapter 34 on Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technology, Cooperation 
and Capacity-Building also states:  
34.2. Environmentally sound technologies in the context of pollution are “process 
and product technologies” that generate low or no waste, for the prevention of 
pollution. They also cover “end of the pipe” technologies for treatment of 
pollution after it has been generated. 
34.3. Environmentally sound technologies are not just individual technologies, 
but total systems which include know-how, procedures, goods and services, and 
equipment as well as organizational and managerial procedures. This implies that 
when discussing transfer of technologies, the human resource development and 
local capacity-building aspects of technology choices, including gender-relevant 
aspects, should also be addressed. Environmentally sound technologies should be 
compatible with nationally determined socio-economic, cultural and 
environmental priorities. 
34.4. There is a need for favourable access to and transfer of environmentally 
sound technologies, in particular to developing countries, through supportive 
measures that promote technology cooperation and that should enable transfer of 
necessary technological know-how as well as building up of economic, technical, 
and managerial capabilities for the efficient use and further development of 
transferred technology. Technology cooperation involves joint efforts by 
enterprises and Governments, both suppliers of technology and its recipients. 
Therefore, such cooperation entails an iterative process involving government, 
the private sector, and research and development facilities to ensure the best 
possible results from transfer of technology. Successful long-term partnerships in 
technology cooperation necessarily require continuing systematic training and 
capacity-building at all levels over an extended period of time. 
34.5. The activities proposed in this chapter aim at improving conditions and 
processes on information, access to and transfer of technology (including the 
state-of-the-art technology and related know-how), in particular to developing 
countries, as well as on capacity-building and cooperative arrangements and 
partnerships in the field of technology, in order to promote sustainable 
development. New and efficient technologies will be essential to increase the 
capabilities, in particular of developing countries, to achieve sustainable 
development, sustain the world's economy, protect the environment, and alleviate 
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The new UNFCCC Technology Mechanism should establish a clear definition of 
“environmentally sound,” as well as technology assessment criteria mindful of science 
and equity.19 These definitions would provide a starting point which would begin to 
balance economic, social and environmental sustainability principles within technology 
governance generally and climate mitigation/adaptation in particular. 
 
 
1. Taking Stock of Environmentally Sound Innovation Network Coordination 
 
 In 2010, the Cancún Agreements encompassed a climate breakthrough on 
technology transfer – freeing innovation from the bargaining chip status that it had 
acquired in the negotiating process to obtain binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
reduction targets. The new Technology Mechanism provides an opportunity to coordinate 
implementation of commitments set forth two decades ago in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)20 and, more recently, in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).21 The Mechanism 
also is an opportunity to prioritize environmentally sound innovation sharing to least 
developed countries.22  
 Article 4(5) of the UNFCCC calls for nations to transfer environmentally sound 
technology.23 Likewise, Article 66 of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) requires developed member nations to help facilitate technology transfer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
poverty and human suffering. Inherent in these activities is the need to address 
the improvement of technology currently used and its replacement, when 
appropriate, with more accessible and more environmentally sound technology. 
 19 Criteria can include consideration of public health and cultural context; ecosystem 
protection; life-cycle analysis; and minimization of non-renewable energy. 
 20 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC]. One 
hundred sixty-five countries ratified the UNFCCC. Id. The convention entered into force on 
March 21, 1994. Id. 
 21 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 27 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining the adoption and 
implementation of TRIPS). 
 22 UNFCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, Decision 1/CP.13., para. 1(d). 
 23 Article 4(5) of the Framework Convention on Climate Change states: 
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II 
shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how 
to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to 
implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed 
country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of endogenous 
capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and 
organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of 
such technologies. 
UNFCCC supra note 20. 
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to least-developed countries and gives such countries greater latitude concerning the 
agreement.24  
Given this legal base, international environmental law and international economic 
legal institutions can coordinate effective efforts to cap and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in a reasonable and equitable manner. 
Environmentally sound technology transfer requires a careful balancing act that 
includes both fair treatment for innovators and energy policies that stimulate global 
diffusion of environmentally sound technology to address climate change. Countries can 
remove export restrictions on environmentally sound technologies and facilitate their 
export through tax relief/rebates for income or sales taxes.25 Such incentives can be 
achieved in a manner consistent with supporting international trade.26 The law is 
unsettled regarding the degree to which environmentally sound technology transfer 
initiatives conflict with such regulations as the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization. International environmental 
law and international economic law have important core objectives that need not be 
mutually exclusive. This tension is at the crux of sustainable development.  
 The UNFCCC calls upon developed parties to take all practicable steps to 
promote, facilitate, and finance transfer/access of environmentally sound technologies 
and know-how to developing countries.27 The legal duty lies with developed state parties 
to the framework convention. In contrast to TRIPS, the UNFCCC broadens the obligation 
from least developed countries to a broader range of developing countries.28 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 24 Article 66 of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) states that:  
In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country 
Members, their economic, financial and administrative constraints, and their 
need for flexibility to create a viable technological base, such Members shall not 
be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 
and 5, for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under 
paragraph 1 of Article 65. The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated 
request by a least-developed country Member, accord extensions of this period. 
Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them 
to create a sound and viable technological base. 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights pt. 4, art. 66, § 12, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.R. 1197, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm7_e.htm. 
 25 Gaetan Verhoosel, Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development: 
Transferring Environmentally Sound Technologies, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 71 (1998). 
 26 See, e.g., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 229. 
 27 UNFCCC Article 4.5 supra note 20. 
 28 See Juan Antonio Duro, On the Automatic Application of Inequality Indexes in the 
Analysis of the International Distribution of Environmental Indicators, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 
76 (2012) 1-7, available at www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon (discussing the “study of the 
international distributive dimension of different environmental indicators such as C02.”) Id. at 1; 
see also MATTHIAS MEYER, LDCS’ TRADE AND INVESTMENT CHALLENGES (2011), available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2010/11/ldcs-trade-and-investment-challenges.pdf (“Not all LDCs 
have the same opportunities and constraints to develop: a majority are medium-size countries 
with a small export base. Some have started to diversify into agro- processing and manufacturing, 
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UNFCCC also requires developed countries to “promote, facilitate and finance” 
technology transfer. Further, this UNFCCC obligation to transfer technology 
encompasses not only a physical transfer of equipment but also know-how. Much ink has 
been spilt and trees felled to produce climate outcome language. “Capacity building” has 
been a consistent but low profile thread running through the climate consensus building 
process. I will explore the contours of this ill-defined notion called capacity building. It 
follows technology transfer as the next faze out of well-seasoned climate negotiators’ 
mouths and can be found attached to most UNFCCC and secondary literature regarding 
technology transfer. Collectively, member states to the UNFCCC have outlined the role 
of the Technology Mechanism host as requiring the following characteristics of network 
leadership: “capability, experience, knowledge, expertise, financial strength and capacity 
to perform the specified activities.”29 With this new innovation centric forum, greater 
collaboration can bridge the treaty language / implementation challenge.  
  
 
2. Why Cooperate at the International Level? Energy-Climate Market Failure   
 
 Stephen Humphreys argues that it is likely to be “unproductive today to approach 
technology transfer as a simple matter of rights and duties. Technology policy will only 
succeed if based on international cooperation.”30 While not universal, there is broad 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
others into mining or modern services. Six oil producers are among the LDCs as well as a group 
of vulnerable small islands. Finally, a number of LDCs are in the throngs of civil strife and 
unresolved statehood.”) Id. 
 29 UNFCCC, CALL FOR PROPOSALS TO HOST THE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM 2 (2012), 
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/technology/application/pdf/cfp_2012-
s1_climate_technology_centre_print.pdf (Annex 1 states the Terms of reference of the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network Mission as: “The mission of the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network is to stimulate technology cooperation and to enhance the development and transfer of 
technologies and to assist developing country Parties at their request, consistent with their 
respective capabilities and national circumstances and priorities, in order to build or strengthen 
their capacity to identify technology needs, to facilitate the preparation and implementation of 
technology projects and strategies taking into account gender considerations to support action on 
mitigation and adaptation and enhance low emissions and climate-resilient development.”) Id. at 
5.  
 30 Stephen Humphreys, BEYOND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN A CLIMATE-CONSTRAINED WORLD xv (2011), INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
POLICY, available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/65/138_ichrp_climate_tech_transfer_report.pdf. (this report 
was drafted by Stephen Humphreys, Lecturer in Law at the London School of Economics based 
on original research undertaken in 2009 and 2010 commissioned by the ICHRP and the following 
six papers: John Barton, Stanford University, Future Climate Technology Regimes: An 
Assessment of the Macro- Environmental Context from a Human Rights Perspective; Simon 
Caney, University of Oxford, Climate Technology Transfer: A Derivation of Rights- and Duties- 
Bearers from Fundamental Human Rights; Marcos Orellana and Dalindyebo Shabalala, 
Technology transfer in the UNFCCC and Other International Legal Regimes: The Challenge of 
Systemic Integration – CEIL; Sisule Musungu, IQSensato, Health: Human Rights, Climate 
Vulnerability and Access to Technology; María Julia Oliva, Union for Ethical Biotrade; 
Promoting the Transfer of Technologies for Adaptation in Agriculture: A Role for the Right to 
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agreement that not responding to climate change will be catastrophic for frontline least 
developed countries that have contributed the least GHG emissions. Humphreys explores 
how the human rights framework provides both a legal and ethical foundation upon 
which to advance technology transfer cooperation.31 In particular, least developed 
countries need technology transfer to adapt to climate change impacts and to sustain 
environmentally sound community development.  
 Through both trade and environmental treaty commitments, the international 
community has recognized state responsibility to transfer technology to least developed 
states. Elsewhere I have explored TRIPS and UNFCCC treaty obligations32 and here I 
focus on the manner in which environmentally sound innovation and diffusion can best 
be facilitated through law. The near universal nature of UNFCCC and TRIPS ratification 
by states supports the argument that international dedication to sharing environmentally 
sound technology with least developed countries is both longstanding and represents 
“hard,” binding law. Yet, dedication might not be the way the average observer would 
describe the degree of technology that has been transferred to date. “Embryonic” or 
“nascent” might be terms that better describe the lack of urgency to broadly diffuse 
climate friendly technologies to frontline communities.  
 Since the 2010 climate conference in Cancún, there has been a clear mandate to 
approach technology transfer cooperation in a manner that embraces human rights. The 
Cancún Agreements reached a milestone in the UNFCCC climate negotiations by 
explicitly recognizing the need to “fully respect human rights” in “all climate change-
related actions.” 33 Human rights law can help provide a framework for innovation and 
diffusion, especially with respect to energy siting decisions and human/environmental 
impact assessments. Elsewhere, I have explored the role of such procedural human rights 
as access to information and public participation with regard to energy siting.34 Here I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Food; and Sivan Kartha, Clarisse Kehler Siebert and Richard Klein, Technology Policies to 
Support Adaptation in Developing Countries: Equity and Rights Considerations – Stockholm 
Environmental Institute.)  
 31 Id. 
 32 See generally Elizabeth Burleson and Winslow Burleson, Innovation Cooperation: 
Energy Biosciences and Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 651 (2011); see also Elizabeth Burleson, 
Energy Policy, Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change,” 18 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (2009); see also Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change 
Consensus: Emerging International Law, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.  543 (2010).  
 33 "Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention" (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, 
December 12, 2010), chapter IVB, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf. 
 34 Elizabeth Burleson, Emerging Law Addressing Climate Change and Water, 5 ENVTL. 
& ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 489 (2010); see also Elizabeth Burleson, Cooperative Federalism and 
Hydraulic Fracturing, _ CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY _ (2013) forthcoming; 
see also Elizabeth Burleson and Stephanie Dodson Dougherty, Arctic Justice: Addressing 
Persistent Organic Pollutants, 30 LAW AND INEQUALITY 57 (2012); see also Elizabeth Burleson, 
The Polar Regions and Environmental Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Shawkat Alam, Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, Tareg M.R. Chowdhury & Erika 
Techera eds., 2012); see also Elizabeth Burleson, Multilateral Climate Change Mitigation, 41 
U.S.F. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
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explore how technology transfer can involve cooperation on both ends to meet not only 
local geographical but also substantive human rights considerations. Law can both foster 
and inhibit technology transfer. As a result, it is difficult to optimize transboundary 
coordination that is mindful of state capacity to balance incentives to innovate with 
access to public goods.  
 In genuinely efficient markets, prices reflect natural resource scarcity value.35 
Where market failure occurs, the OECD argues that prioritizing research, development, 
innovation, education and information should go hand in hand with balancing investment 
vis a vis public interests. In the context of socio-environmental security and resilience, 
the OECD findings suggest that increasing human capital can enhance the benefits of 
shared innovation.36 People in the Global South can absorb and adapt technology to suit 
local conditions. Technology networking can help internalize the negative externality of 
GHG emissions through environmentally sound innovation sharing. 
 Climate is a public good that requires the development of an energy strategy 
based upon international cooperation, energy efficiency, and sustainable development.  
Process and outcome are integral to addressing water, climate, and energy challenges. 
Regulation ought not outweigh the harm that it seeks to address and regulatory 
innovation should incentivize technological innovation to enhance social welfare.37 
Energy innovation has public good characteristics that Hardin38 and Ostrom39 have 
highlighted in their work on commons and that has led to an extensive body of literature 
on how to coordinate public-private commons, semi-commons, and anti-commons 
access. Irrespective of one’s views justifying resorting to property rights, doing so opens 
an array of instruments with which to influence behavior. An important question is how 
public sector policies regarding intellectual property, trade, environmental regulation, tax 
code options to name a few can coordinate economic, equity and environmental 
objectives.  
 If global demand for energy doubles by 2030,40 transitioning to renewables and 
efficiency will be that much more challenging than if business as usual projections were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 35 OECD SECRETARIAT: INPUTS TO THE RIO+20 COMPILATION DOCUMENT 5 (2011) 
available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/234Rio20%20Compilation%20Document_O
ECD%20inputs%20Final.pdf. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Timothy Slating and Jay Kesan, Making Regulatory Innovation Keep Pace With 
Technological Innovation, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1109 (2011); see Sarah Tran, EXPEDITING 
INNOVATION, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (2012) (arguing that capturing the social value of 
emerging green technologies justifies adjusting patent-related regulation). 
 38 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 39 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (encouraging resource appropriators to participate in decision-
making). 
 40 WIPO INPUT FOR THE COMPILATION DOCUMENT FOR THE PREPARATORY PROCESS OF 
THE UN CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2 (2011) WIPO, available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/632WIPO%20Contribution%20to%20Comp
ilation%20Document%20Rio%2020%20Final.pdf (“This shift to a new technology base requires 
policies that incentivize investments in the research and development of new environmentally 
sound technologies and which support the transfer, adaptation and widespread dissemination of 
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to remain constant. Yet, international norm building has been constrained by the United 
States’ “remarkably powerful reluctance to act.”41 Consequently, vocabulary has 
migrated to the economic efficiency end of the spectrum. For instance, we now talk of 
“human capital” rather than education, and of “ecosystem services” rather than nature. 
Doing so is challenging given that demand for environmentally sound, climate friendly 
technologies comes from the need to reduce GHGs to address climate change rather than 
being traditionally market-driven. Existing price signals that drive market activity do not 
create socially optimal outcomes because the impacts of climate change are not reflected 
in the cost of emitting greenhouse gases. Furthermore, communities around the globe that 
would benefit from renewable technologies and energy efficiency innovations lack the 
money with which to transition to environmentally sound options.  
 It is helpful to know what developing countries identify as their technological 
needs. This signals demand criteria to potential manufacturers. Yet the crux of the 
problem is that this demand does not often represent a market – for lack of ability to pay 
for the range of environmentally sound innovations. Just as in relation to ecosystem 
services, there is a lack of a traditional market for many of the technologies needed by 
least developed countries. A market can be created by an international legal instrument if 
emissions of GHGs are linked to payment for climate projects in developing countries.42 
Elsewhere I explore the best practices emerging from the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), EU, and UN approaches to flexible markets for energy innovation.43 
Here I make the case for the catalytic role of environmentally sound innovation networks 
in coordinating international economic and environmental law and policy.  
 
 
D. Uncertainty, Risk, and Life Cycle Analysis 
 
 Energy law discourse regarding transitioning to renewable and energy efficiency 
often stalls at the stage of addressing stranded asset charges despite the more important 
dilemma that the energy-water-climate nexus is central to individual, regional, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
these technologies. A critical component of this new technology base is the need to respond to 
increased demand for energy.”) Id.  
 41 Jody Freeman and Andrew Guzman, CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. INTERESTS, 41 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10695 (2011) (“To date, the primary response to the climate 
change winner argument has been to insist that regardless of the cost-benefit calculation, the 
United States is morally obligated to act either because it is the largest historic contributor to the 
problem (the corrective justice argument), or because it ought to help poorer nations (the 
distributive justice argument).  Alternatively, some suggest that the United States has an ethical 
obligation to future generations.”) Id. at 10696; see also Nigel Purvis, The Case For Climate 
Protection Authority, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 1007 (2009) (explaining the myriad ways in which the 
United States is constrained in ratifying treaties.) 
 42 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Joint Implementation (between developed countries) and 
Clean Development Mechanism (between developed and developing countries) set up just such a 
market. Tons of carbon emitted by one country could be traded for renewable energy projects in 
another country. This cap and trade approach is underway in the EU as well. 
 43 Elizabeth Burleson, From Coase to Collaborative Property Decision-making: Green 
Economy Innovation, 14 TULANE JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 79 
(2011). 
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international security. Scientific and legal uncertainty remain challenges to networks 
capacity to play	  a	  catalytic	  role	  in	  coordinating	  environmentally	  sound	  technology	  innovation	  and	  diffusion.44 Moreover, sustainable development is not well measured by 
GDP. For this reason, the IUCN offers a nature-based lens with which to assess 
environmentally sound decision-making.45 Economic tools, incentives, and policies that 
are mindful of ecosystem services can help internalize environmental costs by accounting 
for such ecosystem benefits as water-energy security.46 The World Bank explains that  
measuring green growth also requires new tools. GDP 
indicates whether an economy is growing, but gives no 
information on whether the growth is sustainable. That is 
why putting in place comprehensive wealth accounts that 
focus on the value of natural capital and ecosystem services, 
and integrating them into development planning is an 
important part of mainstreaming green growth.47 
Broader indicator models include the UN System of Environmental and Economic 
Accounting.48  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 44 Jorge E. Vinuales, LEGAL TECHNIQUES FOR DEALING WITH SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 43 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 437 (2010) (Analyzing how scientific 
uncertainty is handled in international environmental law.) 
 45 IUCN'S POSITION PAPER ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  2 
(2011) for the Rio 2012 Conference June 2012, IUCN, available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/163iucn1.pdf (noting that “IUCN considers 
that an intervention is a nature-based solution if it features the following principles: i) the 
intervention delivers an effective solution to a major global challenge using nature; ii) it provides 
biodiversity benefits in terms of diverse, well-managed ecosystems; iii) it is cost effective relative 
to other solutions; iv) the rationale behind the intervention can be easily and compellingly 
communicated; v) it can be measured, verified and replicated; vi) it respects and reinforces 
communities' rights over natural resources; and vii) it harnesses both public and private sources 
of funding.”) Id.  
 46 Id. 
 47 THE ROAD TO RIO+20 AND BEYOND 3 (2011), World Bank Group, available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/582World%20Bank%20Group1.pdf(noting 
that “Green and inclusive growth is climate-resilient, water-smart, land-saving, energy- efficient 
and reliant on diverse energy sources. It also generates decent jobs and improves livelihoods 
across a diverse set of productive and service sectors. It is underpinned by properly valued natural 
capital, the value of which is fully integrated into countries' systems of national accounts. Green 
and inclusive growth paths factor environmental considerations into government policies and 
business decisions, placing sustainable natural resource management - with its benefits flowing to 
people - at the heart of future development and growth. The improved health of people that stems 
from cleaner air, land and water benefits from and feeds back into this new growth path. Gender 
equality when recognized as “smart economics” enhances productivity and further improves 
development outcomes.”) Id. at 2. 
 48 SUBMISSION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL TO THE 
SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
-“RIO+20 EARTH SUMMIT” (2011), The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), available 
at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/331NRDC%20November%201%20submissi
on%20to%20the%20UNCSD.pdf. 
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 Nathan Mee and Marc Miller have analyzed varying approaches to calculating 
lifecycle costing ranging from actuarial value of a life to cost of CO2 mitigation via 
natural carbon sinks. Based upon these methods, they conclude that the average marginal 
cost of a ton of carbon may be roughly $40 USD, but that even if it is much higher, it is 
prudent to join efforts such as the European cap-and-trade system.49 Doing so can make 
the cost of GHG emissions apparent rather than “pushing the cost off to other places 
where we do not recognize it.”50 Participating in ongoing lifecycle analysis can enable 
states to fulfill their obligation to transfer environmentally sound technologies. In least 
developed countries such technology may not be replacing any previous technology. In 
general, however, technologies transferred would displace less environmentally sound 
technologies. Rather than locking in an absolute technology based standard, this approach 
to technology transfer can be adaptive. 
  Timothy Meyer observes that when bargaining power is stable, “[p]lanned 
renegotiation, such as may be provided by sunset provisions or framework conventions 
that mandate negotiations on future protocols, address [] uncertainty by forcing states 
back to the drawing board to consider changed or evolved circumstances.”51 Economic 
leaders, such as Stern, explain that addressing climate change is more efficient than not 
doing so. Stern calls for two percent of worldwide GDP to be invested annually in 
addressing climate change to protect the twenty percent of global GDP that is at risk if 
nothing is done.52 
  The drawbacks to this argument are distributive, both across time and distance. 
While the IPCC continues to gather and share evolving scientific understanding of 
climate impacts, by its very nature science is grounded in theories rather than facts. In the 
face of scientific uncertainty, the UNFCCC commits member states to proceed based 
upon the precautionary principle.53 Goods and service prices do not currently reflect 
environmental and social costs of production and consumption. Coordination in 
publishing and updating comprehensive energy life cycle analyses can bring transparency 
to the costs and benefits of climate action. I have written on this elsewhere,54 and will 
turn to good governance theory to address complexity and fragmentation in this analysis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 49 Nathan Mee & Marc Miller, Here Comes The Sun: Solar Power Parity With Fossil 
Fuels, 36 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 119 (2011) (“Earth's atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases have dramatically increased since the pre-industrial era.”) Id.  
 50 Id. at 151; See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
WORKING GROUP III ON MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE 
ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (2012) available at http://srren.ipcc-
wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Full_Report.pdf.  
 51 See Timothy Meyer, POWER, EXIT COSTS, AND RENEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 379, 388 (2010) (discussing bargaining power in entering and exiting 
international instruments). 
 52 Juliette Jowit and Patrick Wintour, Cost of Tackling Global Climate Change has 
Doubled, Warns Stern, GUARDIAN, June 25, 2008, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jun/26/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange 
(Lord Stern explains that “[t]o get below 500ppm ... would cost around 2% of GDP.”) Id. 
 53 UNFCCC Article 3 supra note 20. 
 54 Elizabeth Burleson, From Coase to Collaborative Property Decision-making, supra 
note 43 at 79.  
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The next section will consider the role of networks in environmentally sound technology 
governance. 
  
   
III. Environmentally Sound Innovation Sharing  
Via Network Coordination 
 
 Operationalizing sustainability involves public sector incentives that will aid in 
the transition to environmentally sound climate mitigation/adaptation innovations. 
Prioritizing environmental and social dynamics in economic decisions can help move the 
conversation from treaty language to measurable implementation.55 The Secretary 
General of the UN suggests that “making explicit the economic, social and environmental 
costs of action and inaction; recognizing the importance of innovation, new technologies, 
international cooperation and investments”56 can help shift the paradigm. I argue that a 
catalytic approach involves global North/South coordination on climate-energy 
technological, financial and capacity building cooperation.  
 
 
A. Prioritizing Human Rights and Environmental Public Goods 
 
 Integrating best practices from human rights and environmental law can provide a 
synergistic catalyst for addressing climate change by mitigating, adapting, funding, and 
transferring environmentally sound innovations.  
 Solutions to climate instability involve (1) reducing GHGs, (2) adapting to 
inevitable changes, (3) funding this adaptation and mitigation, and (4) sharing 
environmentally sound innovations. These innovations can be both technological and 
legal.57 This analysis considers ways in which human rights and environmental best 
practices can synergistically mitigate, adapt, fund, and share innovations in an efficient 
and equitable manner. It will do so by drawing upon successful good governance models 
from international and comparative law.  
 Efforts are underway to broaden Aarhus procedural rights to a clean environment 
beyond the European context and fully implement Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
globally. In the interim, the pertinent developed states in a position to transfer technology 
have largely ratified the Aarhus Convention.58 Taking a human rights frame can foster 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 55 UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 1 at 5 (The UN Secretary-General’s High-Level 
Panel on Global Sustainability observes that policy coherence can help the Brundtland report’s 
sustainable development pillars (1) economic growth, (2) social equality and (3) environmental 
sustainability move from theory to practice.) 
 56 Id. 
 57 See generally Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Policy, Intellectual Property and Technology 
Transfer to Address Climate Change, supra note 32; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Climate 
Change Consensus: Emerging International Law, supra note 32. 
 58 Both energy siting decisions in the field and international technology decision making 
at various international law gatherings should implement human rights best practices: including 
access to information, public participation, and justice as set forth in the Aarhus convention. See 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice regarding Environmental Matters (Århus Convention), June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 
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international technology cooperation generally and concrete multilateral mechanisms that 
incentivize, fund and diffuse technology transfer.59 For instance, reducing black carbon 
through innovative cook stoves and heating options has co-benefits for public health and 
addressing climate change.60  
 International human rights law offers a robust justice framework with which to 
address climate change.61 Applying human rights thresholds to climate change can 
catalyze cooperative action. Decisions informed by an understanding of climate justice 
can bring together dialogue from development, human rights, environment, trade, and 
business communities. Energy-food-climate security can be discussed as the interwoven 
crisis that threatens humanity rather than unrelated dilemmas. The 2007 Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
subsequent studies clarify that delay in international climate consensus building threatens 
millions of people’s resilience to climate related water scarcity, flooding, fire, and food 
insecurity.62  In the Human Rights and Climate Change resolution 7/23, the U.N. 
Human Rights Council requested the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner to study the 
effects of climate change on human rights.63 The subsequent study states “United Nations 
human rights treaty bodies all recognize the intrinsic link between the environment and 
the realization of a range of human rights, such as the right to life, to health, to food, to 
water, and to housing.64 Human Rights Council resolution 10/4 on Human Rights and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1999) (entered into force Oct. 30, 2001), available at 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf. The convention was negotiated among the 
Member States of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). On June 25, 
1998, the convention was adopted at a pan-European meeting of environment ministers in Århus, 
Denmark. All of the member states of the European Union and the EU itself signed. The 
convention entered into force on October 30, 2001; see also Humphreys, supra note 30 at xvii.  
 59 Humphreys, supra note 30 at xvi. 
 60 Black carbon continues to compromise the international community’s capacity to 
address climate change. Its contribution to indoor air pollution similarly makes transitioning to 
cleaner cooking fuels both a strong demand and supply minus the capacity to pay or bring cleaner 
cook stoves to scale in least developed countries. Green Building programs may be the most 
effective law, policy, and volunteer collaborative approach to addressing black carbon and 
transitioning to cleaner lighting and cooking solutions; c.f. Pills composed of various percentages 
of given chemicals requires some measurable, reportable, and verifiable quality control but are an 
order of magnitude more simplified in mass distribution than the range of environmentally sound 
technologies. As a result, reaching agreement has been harder in in the climate-energy-water 
context than the medical context.  
 61 See e.g. SVITLANA KRAVCHENKO & JOHN BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: CASES, LAW, AND POLICY, (Carolina University Press: 2008); see also Donald 
Anton and Dinah Shelton, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS  (Cambridge 
University Press: 2011). 
 62 CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 - SYNTHESIS REPORT, adopted at IPCC Plenary 
Spain, 12-17 November 2007 (IPCC AR4 Synthesis Report) at 72. 
 63 OHCHR STUDY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (A/HRC/10/61) delivered to the tenth session of the Human Rights Council held in 
March 2009.  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/docs/Resolution_7_23.pdf 
 64 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND REPORTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
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Climate Change recognizes that “effective international cooperation to enable the full, 
effective and sustained implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change … is important in order to support national efforts for the realization of 
human rights implicated by climate change-related impacts.”65 Discrimination can 
exacerbate climate vulnerable individuals and communities and impact effective public 
sector response measures. Recently, the Human Rights Council agreed to designate an 
Environment and Human Rights Expert to look at the synergies and challenges at the 
overlapping center of economic, social, and environmental spheres.66 
 Robinson notes that “Women’s voices must be heard and their priorities 
supported as part of climate justice.”67 Within frontline communities, women, children,68 
and indigenous communities struggle the most with capacity building to keep climate 
change from impacting human rights. For instance, Arctic communities, whose 
traditional knowledge about the ice is no longer able to inform food security decision-
making, can still make significant contributions to climate-energy-water implications for 
climate mitigation and adaptation. Inclusive decision-making and resilience diffusion 
empowers these communities. International cooperation can establish protection 
mechanisms for climate-displaced individuals, both within and across national boundaries. 
Similarly, global collaboration can achieve sustainable development pathways that 
encompass climate mitigation and adaptation. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change highlights the precautionary principle and 
intergenerational equity – two key norms that can contribute to further human rights 
protections.69 Bringing together international economic, human rights and environmental 
law can advance sustainable development.  
 Lemley observes that new innovations are often “invented simultaneously or 
nearly simultaneously by two or more teams working independently of each other,”70 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
COMMISSIONER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 5, A/HRC/10/61 15 January 2009, available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/103/44/PDF/G0910344.pdf?OpenElement 
 65 http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_10_4.pdf.  
 66 A/HRC/19/34, Dec. 16, 2011, available at  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/19session/A.HRC.19.34_en.pdf (Human 
Rights Council Nineteenth session Agenda items 2 and 3 Annual report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and 
the Secretary-General Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights, including the right to development.)  
 67 Mary Robinson Foundation - Climate Justice at 1, available at 
http://www.mrfcj.org/about (discussing women’s role at the forefront of climate justice 
initiatives.) 
 68 CESCR general comments No. 12, para. 7, and No. 15, para. 11. 
 69 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT supra 64 note 29. 
 70 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012) 
(“patent owners--even the owners of the most famous and important inventions--are 
overwhelmingly not people who have invented something no one else could have done. They are 
making incremental improvements alongside others tackling the same problem and often coming 
up with the same solution at about the same time.”) Id. at 738; See also Brian J. Love, Interring 
the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 379 (2012). (“dominant pioneer patent rights 
generally stifle rather than promote innovation because they significantly discourage investment 
in the development of next-generation technology”) Id. 
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which he concludes is problematic for classic theories of patent law. Lemley suggests that 
patent races might be worth supporting.71 He recommends surveying innovators to further 
flesh out what motivates individuals and groups to invent. He identifies that some sectors 
progress irrespective of patents, noting that “[o]rdinary economic rents, coupled with 
non-patent advantages such as first-mover benefits and brand reputation, have long 
proved sufficient to encourage entry into new markets even in the absence of patent 
protection. We don't have computer software or social networks because of patents; 
indeed, if anything, patents interfere with market entry in those fields.”72 Lemley 
evaluates how patents can inhibit enabling inventions that are the gateway to a wide array 
of other innovations. 
 Patent pools and exemptions offer useful approaches for some technologies while 
they stall innovation in other areas. Just as one technology will not fit all local conditions, 
one intellectual property approach does not fit all climate cooperation contexts. 
Innovation governance provides a transactional framework within which to coordinate 
supply and demand for technology solutions. Currently, small company (and country) 
market entry is problematic in the face of incumbent predominance in the intellectual 
property landscape. Moreover, lending is often conditioned upon borrowers having 
existing patents. Elsewhere I have explored international institutional change agent 
leadership in integrating energy access into development goals.73 Here I focus on the role 
that networks can play in facilitating environmentally sound innovation and diffusion that 
is mindful of science and equity. 
 Least developed countries should not be the dumping ground for technology 
transfer of obsolete energy infrastructure while other states transition to lower GHG 
options. Least developed countries may not be in a position to transition to the most 
advanced technologies in the near term but they can, through global network cooperation, 
pick their low lying energy efficiency and renewable fruit. In other words, rainwater 
harvesting, drip irrigation, black carbon mitigation through solar and advanced cook 
stoves are simple, often off patent, technologies that do not present significant intellectual 
property right (IPR) obstacles but do require enabling conditions to bring to scale across 
whole continents. Without country targets, least developed countries will likely rely on 
the international community to facilitate such climate mitigation. Furthermore, human 
rights strengthen the already strong climate impetus for balancing IPR objections to 
technology transfer with rationales for appropriate adaptive open licensing, patent 
pooling, innovation incentives such as prizes, and other subsidies.74   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 71 Id. at 750 (“It is often competition, not monopoly, that spurs innovators to action.”) Id. 
at 754. 
 72 Id. at 740. 
 73 Elizabeth Burleson & Diana Pei Wu, Non-State Actor Access and Influence in 
International Legal and Policy Negotiations, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 193, 201 (2010); see 
also Humphreys, supra note 30 at xvi (noting that “[a]t present, 1.4 billion people live without 
access to electricity and at least 2.7 billion depend on biomass burning for their cooking and 
heating. A recent report by a special advisory group to the UN Secretary-General makes clear that 
universalising access to modern and clean energy technologies is affordable, manageable and 
urgent.”) Id. at xvi. 
 74 Humphreys, supra note 30 at xvii (Policy on technology need not pivot entirely on IP 
rights – many of the technologies in question do not involve significant patent royalties.) Id. 
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 Enhancing community based innovation and sharing know-how can optimize 
environmentally sound technology diffusion by adapting technologies to local cultural or 
geographic circumstances.75 To this end, open-source collaboration provides the efficacy 
and transparency with which to overcome existing information asymmetries. While 
markets can increase demand for innovations, they do not tend to direct knowledge goods 
to those not able to pay for them. As I have explained in a series of articles and 
presentations since 2009, innovation prizes and other policy incentives can incentivize 
innovation irrespective of IPRs and can likely increase the pace of environmentally sound 
technology diffusion.76 
 
 
B. Taking Stock of Innovation Networking Governance 
 
 
 The new Climate Technology Centre and Network is well positioned to enhance 
the diffusion of pro-poor, ecosystem based, and environmentally sound technologies. The 
Climate Technology Centre and Network can help coordinate Green Climate Fund 
financing to share R&D as well as existing mitigation and adaptation technologies.77  
 At Durban in 2012, the UNFCCC parties took further steps to launch the Climate 
Technology Center and Network78 and established a Durban Forum to share ideas and 
best practices for capacity building.79 The new Adaptation Committee is tasked with 
coordinating distribution of Green Climate Fund financing to low-income country 
adaptation measures, many of which will depend upon environmentally sound technology. 
Now that the Technology Mechanism is being established, low-income parties can 
develop and submit project proposals. These developments increase the ability of 
countries to cooperate in order to reach Cancún commitments agreed to in 2010. Further 
work to be done includes identifying resources to carry out this innovation networking 
governance and linking innovation hub initiatives into a catalytic network. 
 Coordinating economic, human rights, and environmental dynamics of innovation 
requires substantial cooperation and insight going forward. The complexity of each of 
these respective regimes makes the challenge of collaborating on innovation that much 
more crucial. Discussing the TRIPS / UNFCCC nexus on technology transfer can help 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 75 KEITH E. MASKUS AND RUTH L. OKEDIJI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS, 
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY OPTIONS 15 (2010). 
 76 See Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Policy, Intellectual Property, and Technology Transfer 
to Address Climate Change, supra note 32 at 81; See also MASKUS AND OKEDIJI, supra 75 note 
at 16 (Reasons that innovators may forgoe patents include: patent filing and maintenance fees, 
ability to use trade secrets, and long waiting periods to receive patents.)  
 77 Joshua Sarnoff, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND CLIMATE CHANGE, 16 Va. J.L. & Tech. 301, 
333 (2011); see also UNFCCC Convention, at art. 4.1(c) supra note 20 (The climate network can 
help facilitate “global demonstration programs, open innovation mechanisms (including 
technology prizes and platforms), model research and development agreements, improved 
operation and maintenance practices and training and organizational procedures, patent pools, and 
public databases on licensing activities.”) Id. 
 78 Decision -/CP.17, National Adaptation Plans; see also FCCC/CP/2011/L.8/Add.1. 
 79 Id. ¶¶ 144–56. 
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close the 6-11 gigaton greenhouse gas gap.80 It remains important to provide a framework 
for innovation hubs that ensures environmentally sound technology transfer. Life cycle 
analysis, capacity building, and cultural sensitivity need to be ongoing, adaptive, and 
central to discussions.  
 Optimizing cooperative transboundary green innovation can facilitate inclusive 
decision-making, just as public participation by civil society can help economies 
transition to environmentally sound energy use.  Public participation by civil society 
increases procedural legitimacy. Meaningful consent requires governments to facilitate 
processes by which members of the public analyze the appropriate level of governmental 
intervention. While scientists can narrow the range of technical uncertainty, ordinary 
individuals have the capacity to make value judgments. A transparent, international 
forum facilitates inclusive decision-making. This is important since the means often are 
the ends. How one makes a decision affects the substantive provision enacted. Good 
governance involves accountability, transparency, participation, consensus building, 
responsiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, and equity.81 Inclusive climate-consensus 
building can help achieve genuine sustainable development on the global scale and gather 
innovation insights well suited to pluralistic community dynamics.  
 
 
C. Recommendations for Inclusive Innovation Hubs 
 
 I argue that the top priority for the Technology Mechanism should be to adopt the 
Agenda 21 definition of environmentally sound technology and clarify requirements for 
environmental integrity. Similarly, setting forth good governance procedures for the new 
Technology Mechanism should also be prioritized as instrumental to effective innovation 
cooperation.  
 With regard to least developed countries, if Technology Mechanism activities 
become based upon country requests for assistance then it is crucial to remain mindful 
that least developed countries are not well positioned to request such assistance. 
Another area that still needs to be hammered out includes what permanent funding link 
will facilitate innovation governance, beyond the interim connection to the GEF (Global 
Environment Facility).  
 Potentially, the Technology Mechanism can expand upon the prototype of the 
UNFCCC’s own clearinghouse called “TT: Clear,”82 in the spirit of Linux and in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 80 UNEP, Bridging the Emissions Gap to Meet 2-Degree Target Doable, Nov 23, 2011, at 
1, available at 
http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2659&ArticleID=8955 (UNEP 
“[o]utlines the Pathways to 2020 Able to Deliver the Additional 6 to 11 Gigatonne Cuts Needed 
to Get World onto Safe track”). 
 81 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, supra note 
11. 
 82 Websites designed as “clearing houses” to facilitate “information exchange” (such as 
the UNFCCC’s own “TT: Clear”) see unfccc.int/home/items/3092.php; see also  
STAKEHOLDER FORUM FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL, AND 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 
DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST 
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cooperation with such initiatives as the open source Eco-Patent Commons and sliding 
scale GreenXchange.83 Knowledge portals can share best practices through on-line 
uploading/downloading of innovations and consequently help spread environmentally 
sound distributed power, battery innovation, rainwater harvesting, drip irrigation, 
culturally sound solar cookers and a wide array of other environmentally sound 
technologies. In addition to online clearinghouse capacity building, on the ground 
innovation hubs can form a global network of innovation centers to facilitate diffusion of 
climate friendly innovations.  
 The Climate Technology Center and Network can expand the international 
“innovation ecosystem” – helping countries continue ongoing needs assessment and 
approaches suited to given countries.84 Governance models upon which the Technology 
Mechanism can build include the efficient secretariats for: REN21, UNEP, and U.S. 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). 85 The climate network can maximize 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
CENTURY (SD21), Review of implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles (2012) 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_sd21st/21_pdf/SD21_Study1_Agenda21.pdf. 
(discussing coordination of common standards and definitions of web-based technology 
information clearing house coordination, “linking TT:CLEAR to national and regional 
technology centres including the UNEP Sustainable Alternatives Network (SANet), the Clean 
Energy Portal (CEP), Canada, the Climate Technology Cooperation Gateway of the United States 
of America (US-CTC Gateway), the International Technology Trade Centre (ITTC) of Tsinghua 
University, China, and the Tunis International Centre for Environmental Technologies 
(CITET).”); See also http://cleanenergysolutions.org/; See also http://ClimateTechWiki.org; see 
also WIPO INPUT FOR THE COMPILATION DOCUMENT FOR THE PREPARATORY PROCESS OF THE 
UN CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT supra 40 note at 2.  
 83 See Eco-Patent Commons, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
available at http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons.aspx; 
see also GreenXchange, available at http://www.thegreenx.com/ 
 84 LETHA TAWNEY, FRANCISCO ALMENDRA, PABLO TORRES, AND LUTZ WEISCHER,  
TWO DEGREES OF INNOVATION—HOW TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES IN LOW-CARBON POWER, 
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 39 (2011), at 1 available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/two_degrees_of_innovation.pdf; see generally HELEEN DE 
CONINCK, CONCEPTS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY 
CENTER AND NETWORK UNDER THE UNFCCC, COORDINATED LOW EMISSIONS ASSISTANCE 
NETWORK (2011) available at http://prod-http-80-800498448.us-east-
1.elb.amazonaws.com/w/images/a/a8/CTCN_Implementation_Framework_CLEAN_paper.pdf; 
See also THE CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 10 (2011) ICTSD 
available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/04/technologymechanism.pdf (“Overall, the
 new T echnology Mechanism potentially represents a step to move beyond the 
‘conventional’ approach to technology transfer under the climate regime – based essentially on 
capacity building and technology needs assessments – to a more ‘dynamic’ one geared towards 
fostering public-private partnerships; promoting innovation; catalysing the use of technology road 
maps or action plans; mobilizing national, regional and international technology centres; and 
facilitating joint R&D activities. The task facing the Technology Mechanism is arduous.”) Id.  
 85 HELEEN DE CONINCK, CONCEPTS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK supra note 
84 at 15; see also MAJOR GROUP FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH CONTRIBUTION TO THE OUTCOME 
DOCUMENT OF RIO+20 (2011), available at  (“The creation of a ‘Global Technology Sharing 
Facility,’ which would enhance sharing, enable prior assessments and provide monitoring of 
technology on the global scale. Alternatives to market-based intellectual property rights have to 
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learning opportunities to build on one another’s insights through opportunities to come 
together in forums and visit each other’s innovation hubs (both virtually and in the field). 
Such networking can facilitate community data systems, webinars, and outreach tailored 
to given communities.86 Local, regional, sectoral and global innovation forums together 
with clearing houses can form resilient innovation hubs. Organizations and initiatives can 
share best practices, provide technical assistance, tackle new innovation challenges and 
work together to address remaining obstacles to environmentally sound innovation 
diffusion. 87 
 Technology transfer has been a central factor in ongoing climate network 
coordination efforts since the drafting of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Article 4.5 of the Convention requires developed countries 
to “take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer 
of, or access to environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, 
particularly developing country parties to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention.”88 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines technology 
transfer as "a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and 
equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders 
such as governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and research/education institutions."89 The new Technology 
Mechanism, established in the December 2010 Cancún Agreements, can coordinate a 
catalytic transgovernmental network that, among other activities, shares best practices.90  
 A Technology Mechanism has been established under the UNFCCC Conference 
of the Parties, consisting of (1) a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and (2) a 
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). Implementing the technology transfer 
framework of Article 4, paragraph 5 of the UNFCCC will be a priority for the TEC. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be developed and new digital information infrastructures could foster the rapid circulation of 
knowledge and technologies worldwide, based on the notions of fair access and mutual benefit 
sharing. We must also protect and nurture traditional, local and Indigenous knowledge and 
recognise their value as alternative technologies. Public and private stakeholders must collaborate 
internationally and strive to incorporate cradle to cradle design into new and existing 
technological and product lifecycles.”) Id. 
 86 Id. at 17.  
 87 See generally ICTSD, PROPOSALS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR 
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD) TO THE RIO+ 20 PREPARATORY PROCESS 
(2011) available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/455Submission%20Rio20%20ICTSDFINA
L.pdf. 
 88 UNFCCC Article 4.5 supra note 20; see also Article 4.7 establishes a clear link 
between the extent to which developing countries will implement their commitments under the 
UNFCCC and the effective implementation by developed countries of their commitments relating 
to financial resources and the transfer of technology.” Id. 
 89 IPCC, METHODOLOGICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES IN 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, A SPECIAL REPORT OF WG III (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).  
 90 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, 
December 12, 2010), chapter IVB, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_ 
lca.pdf. 
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CTCN will gather regional, state, sectoral and civil society technology network 
participants to enhance technology transfer. The CTCN will facilitate existing networks, 
organizations, and initiatives in order to provide assistance to developing countries on 
identifying technology needs, implementation, and deployment. 91 The UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties has also decided to strengthen capacity building support via 
networks for sharing communication, education, information, public awareness, training 
and stakeholder participation. 92 
 Best practices in innovation cooperation include knowledge sharing as well as 
joint research, development and demonstration.93 Network leadership can involve 
UNFCCC's Climate Technology Center and Network, Clean Energy Ministerial, 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and other innovative collaborations.94 
Dedicated to renewable energy, the new IRENA95 may be able to catalyze a more timely 
pace of action than has occurred within the UNFCCC.96 Developing country change 
agents, such as IRENA and UNDP supported projects in the field, can begin to address 
the enabling environment rationale with which developed countries have based slow 
implementation of technology transfer. 
 IPRs can be balanced with innovation sharing in a manner that neither stems the 
flow of environmentally sound technology transfer nor divests property rights wholesale. 
It is clear that IPRs remain a political stumbling block for countries such as the United 
States where large innovative corporations have influenced state negotiating. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 91 Decision 1/CP.16 includes the outcome of work by the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and covers the main 
elements of the Bali Road Map. Decision 1/CMP.6 reflects the outcome of the work undertaken 
by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWG-KP). at 121. (The TEC will consider and recommend actions to promote 
environmentally sound technology transfer; provide guidance on policy and program priorities; 
facilitate collaboration between governments, the private sector, NGOs, and academic and 
research communities; recommend actions to address barriers to technology transfer; and catalyze 
development and use of technology road maps or action plans.) 
 92 Id. 
 93 LETHA TAWNEY AND LUTZ WEISCHER, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
SUPPORTING LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT WITH CLIMATE FINANCE INTERNATIONAL 
INNOVATION SYSTEM 1 (2011) WRI available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/innovation_and_technology_transfer.pdf. 
 94 Id. 
 95 IRENA - International Renewable Energy Agency, available at  
http://www.irena.org/home/index.aspx?mnu=hom; see also TAWNEY AND WEISCHER, 
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER supra note 93 at 5 (“IRENA represents a multilateral 
approach to tapping expertise and collecting information. Where the Clean Energy Ministerial 
initiatives are geared towards middle income and emerging economies, 
IRENA has very broad participation, like the UNFCCC. It is intended to permanently house 
expertise on renewable energy development and implementation, though with a heavy focus on 
the latter.”) Id. 
 96 “Technology transfer and innovation happen within a complex system of relationships 
between governments, companies, financiers, regulators and others. The UNFCCC cannot fulfill 
all of the functions necessary for an effective international system of innovation. Many other 
forums are important to incubating innovation and ensuring successes spread widely and quickly,” 
TAWNEY AND WEISCHER, supra note 93 at 1.  
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Furthermore, technology transfer has been held back, despite “oven ready” language, as a 
bargaining chip with which to negotiate more contentious issues such as measurable, 
reportable, and verifiable (MRV) mitigation commitments.97 
 The international community can build upon the new technology mechanism 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)98 to 
share environmentally sound technologies such as solar lamps, solar cookers, drip 
irrigation, and rainwater harvesting. Such innovations can lower fuel consumption per 
unit of power generated and expand access to energy. 
 An international database housing green technologies and best practices99 can 
enhance implementation of technology transfer and enabling activities such as technical 
training, capacity-building, and R&D cooperation.100 The technology mechanism should 
facilitate sectoral technology cooperation by sharing best practices and best available 
technologies, both current and emerging.101  
 Coordinated public private initiatives should diffuse environmentally optimal 
technologies and practices across power production, transportation, and waste 
management.102 Countries should enhance inclusive gatherings and networks with civil 
society.103 Global cooperation should ramp up efforts to find replacement technologies to 
address climate security. Best practice diffusion requires information sharing, awareness 
raising, and capacity building to realize co-benefits from climate mitigation and other 
shared goals.  
 Green building exemplifies a public private practice that can integrate social 
equity and environmental concerns. Jurisdictions are beginning to implement the private 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) rating system that establishes a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 97 Elizabeth Burleson and Cesare Romano, “Cancun Climate Negotiations,” 15 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHT 41 (2011) co-author. 
 98 See UNFCCC Article 4.5 supra note 20; cf. A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 27(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), (Dec. 10, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ 
documents/udhr/index.shtml#a27 (“Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life 
of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”) Id. 
 99 Id. ¶ 195. 
 100 See Id. ¶ 196. 
 101 Id. 
 102 VAN SMITH, ENABLING ENVIRONMENTS OR ENABLING DISCORD: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, AND THE QUEST FOR GREEN 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. REV. 817, 848 (2011) (discussing the advantages of 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). 
 103 William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global 
Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 457 (2010) 
(“In order for nested, polycentric forms of climate governance to work, they will have to be 
assembled from above and below, with careful attention to who wins and who loses, careful 
attention to the tactical opportunities that emerge to influence the assemblage in ways that 
enhance meaningful participation across and within the different nested levels. The project of 
global environmental law, if it is ever going to be more than a catch-all for the varied and variable 
forms of transnational environmental governance taking shape in multiple domains, will need to 
engage with all of this in much more direct fashion, which means getting out and working in 
these diverse and complicated places, getting out and understanding how global projects are being 
worked out in concrete institutional settings all over the world.”) Id. at 549-550. 
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point system.104  
 The Green Building Council offers a framework for action based upon (1) 
enhancing zoning codes and development ordinances for green building and (2) condition 
public financing on sustainability criteria.105 With the LEED rating system for green 
buildings currently covering nearly 10 billion square feet of real estate globally, the 
Green Building Council proposes that broad support for resilient sustainable 
infrastructure can reduce poverty, enhance environmental sustainability, and address 
equity.106 
 A just transition to a green economy requires frameworks that are responsive to 
present and future societal needs in an accountable, effective, transparent, equitable, and 
inclusive manner. Devolving environmental regulation to industry moves issues out of 
the public sphere. People have a right to participate in decisions that affect their social 
and physical environment.107 One area in which this public participation versus industry 
experts discussion is being played out is within the growing field of green building 
standards, which are in flux as jurisdictions recognize the need to mitigate climate change. 
Building codes seek to preserve health, safety, and welfare while enabling private 
development of land. Governance has expanded to encompass water management, 
construction materials, indoor air quality, and efficiency.108 The private, voluntary LEED 
program109 awards points for a myriad of environmental measures. In addition to 
subsidies, loans and fast track permitting, communities have used LEED as a basis upon 
which to incentivize green building.110  
 Linking network clearinghouses of best practices would facilitate increased 
efficiency and sound energy use.111 Solutions can vary from region to region. While not 
suitable to all locations, straw bale construction is earthquake-resilient, is a great insulator 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 104 See generally U.S. Green Building Council, LEED Rating Systems, http:// 
www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=222 (discussing the LEED rating systems).  
 105 See generally BUILDING THE GREEN ECONOMY FROM THE GROUND UP: SUSTAINABLE 
CITIES AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT (2011) Prepared jointly for the 2012 United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20) Compilation Document by the U.S. Green 
Building Council and the Green Building Council Brazil, available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/Building%20the%20Green%20Economy%2
0from%20the%20Ground%20Up.pdf (suggesting that the international community invest in 
resilient, green buildings.) Id. 
 106 Id.  
 107 Lopez Ostra v Spain 16798/90 [1994] ECHR 46 (9 December 1994) and Guerra v. 
Italy 14967/89 [1998] ECHR 7 (19 February 1998). 
 108 For a discussion of tribal governance in the area of land use see Nicholas Fromherz 
and Joseph Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sovereignty and Standing After 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 131 (2010). 
 109 U.S. Green Building Council, LEED Rating Systems, supra note 104; see also Charles 
J. Kibert & Kevin Grosskopf, Envisioning Next-Generation Green Buildings, 23 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 145, 148 (2007). 
 110 See generally Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to Foster Green 
Building, Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2008). 
 111 Stephen Miller, Commercial Green Leasing in the Era of Climate Change: Practical 
Solutions For Balancing Risks, Burdens, And Incentives, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
10487, at 10495 (2010). 
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and promotes tribal youth jobs. Communities can build sustainable quality homes that 
save water, reduce energy bills, and help people become resilient to climate extremes 
while contributing to climate adaptation and mitigation.  
 Transparent, legitimate, and accountable governments are the most likely to be 
able to achieve good governance and cooperate with one another in decision-making 
forums.  This cooperation involves time and trust. Governments and civil society must 
remain committed to justice, respecting varying cultural approaches to conflict resolution.  
 Human rights and environmental institutions have the capacity to bring people 
together to address governance gaps. Reaching carbon neutrality in an affordable, 
environmentally sound way requires integrating strategies between mitigation, adaptation, 
development, and disaster risk reduction in a manner that is mutually reinforcing and 
mindful of disadvantaged communities.  
 Public participation can sustain trust in governments and strengthen the 
legitimacy of legal decisions. Inclusive stakeholder participation brings new perspectives 
to problem solving as well as trust and support for implementation. In this manner 
environmental justice can be integrated into an effective, equitable environmental 
protection program. 
 
 
D. Looking Forward: Catalytic Intra-Network Dynamics  
 
 Taylor-Ide’s work highlights the importance of beginning simply, being true to 
process, remembering that the means are the ends, and growing capacity through 
networks.112 Nesting network norm generation can lead to international coordination at a 
level and pace at which cooperation can be sustained. Network activities can involve 
policy coherence high level panels, EST special procedure and disseminating knowledge 
sharing studies. Such norm generation may facilitate the geo-political climate with which 
to consider a joint reciprocal protocol among such international regimes as the WTO and 
UNFCCC.  
 UN bodies can diffuse the human rights frame for innovation and diffusion 
through recommendations in the context of their mandates, be they human rights oriented 
like UNHCR, environmentally oriented like UNEP, or trade and IP oriented like the 
WTO and WIPO. Just as UNESCO coordinates UN-Water, WIPO would be well 
positioned to help provide coordination leadership on Climate-IPR-Trade-Human Rights.  
Networks can take on a variety of forms and functions, including: 
 
• Judicial Networks are providing best practices, particularly in building 
judicial capacity to address international law, environmental science, 
complex patent disputes and a range of other multifaceted challenges. 
UNEP and INECE have been change agents for increased networking 
among judges to increase environmental capacity and scientific literacy.113 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 112 See generally Daniel C. Taylor, Carl E. Taylor, Jesse O. Taylor, Empowerment on an 
Unstable Planet: From Seeds of Human Energy to a Scale of Global Change (Oxford University 
Press: 2012). 
 113 INECE, CHAPTER TWELVE, TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS 384, 
available at  http://inece.org/mlw/Chapter12_TransgovernmentalNetworks.pdf; see also Edited 
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• Production networks involve local suppliers from around the world that 
interact to coordinate the supply and demand of goods and services. 
Knowledge sharing includes technology and know how passed along 
global supply chains but least developed countries do not have significant 
access to such knowledge spillovers.114 
 
• Small Developing Island Renewable Energy Knowledge and Technology 
Transfer Network (DIREKT), with EU funding and universities participation 
from Germany, Fiji, Mauritius, Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago. Activities 
include technology centers cooperating on improving renewable energy science 
and technology innovation and diffusion.115 
 
• Joint European-Latin American Universities Renewable Energy Project 
involves universities from Germany, Latvia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Guatemala 
on university level renewable energy capacity building with which to enhance 
absorptive capacity for environmentally sound innovations.116 
 
• Climate Action Network (CAN) coordinates environmental non-state 
actor involvement in ongoing climate negotiations.117  
 
• International Institutional Networks include UN Energy, UN Water. 
These umbrella entities have been able to coordinate state, international 
organization, and non-state cooperation on cross cutting issues.118 
 
This is clearly a snapshot approach but it highlights some of the networks engaged in 
intra-network collaboration. Among the IP community, WIPO can enhance its ability to 
coordinate nested networking and be a gateway from the intellectual property community 
to IRENA and its growing renewable energy community. Similarly, technology network 
policy coordination can build upon such single sector transboundary networks as water 
compacts that represent effective intra-network norms generation and transboundary 
natural resource management. Furthermore, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) offers a transgovernmental network model, one built upon reciprocal enabling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by Zu Waldeck und Pyrmont Wolrad Prinz, Martin J. Adelman, Robert Brauneis, Josef Drexl and 
Ralph Nack, and Alison Firth, Patents And Technological Progress In A Globalized World - 
Liber Amicorum Joseph Straus, E.I.P.R. 2010, 32(4), 184-189 (2010) (discussing the need to 
“increase the expertise of local judges in patent cases, and create new centers for patent cases.”) 
Id. at 473.  
 114 MASKUS AND OKEDIJI, supra 75 at 5.  
 115 Small Developing Island Renewable Energy Knowledge and Technology Transfer 
Network (DIREKT), available at http://www.direkt-project.eu/objectives.html. 
 116 see generally, Joint European-Latin American Universities Renewable Energy Project, 
available at http://www.jelare-project.eu/. 
 117 see generally, Climate Action Network available at  http://www.climatenetwork.org/. 
 118 see e.g. UN Water available at http://www.unwater.org/ and UN Energy’s Knowledge 
Network available at http://www.un-energy.org/. 
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legislation in each participating state. The next section addresses the need to transition 
from regime shifting to international network coordination. 
 
 
IV. From Regime Shifting to International Network Coordination 
 
 The principle of mutual supportiveness remains an under-theorized area of 
international law and policy. Yet, it is gaining credence in large part due to its inclusion 
in the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)119 and the Doha 
Declaration.120 Both instruments also call for the diffusion of environmentally sound 
technologies; this enhances the capacity for greater coordination among trade and 
environment forums to work out the details of economically, socially, and 
environmentally sound innovation sharing.121 
 While knowledge goods are better understood than several decades ago, much 
remains to be mapped with regard to innovation and diffusion landscapes. International 
institutions, states, and non-state actors have stepped into this uncertainty and 
experimented in different directions with different degrees of public support. 
 When international regimes conflict, it is perplexing how to develop a legal 
argument by balancing legal principles and the reasons and rationale behind given rules. 
Legal reasoning often occurs in parallel trade and environmental contexts where theory 
construction occurs based upon distinct building blocks. Seeking collaboration with the 
Climate Technology Center and Network, WIPO describes its new initiative as follows: 
 
WIPO Green enables owners of proprietary technologies to make selected 
technologies and solutions available as packages, including related know-
how, services and materials and facilitates the matching of specific user-
formulated needs with technology providers. In addition, it provides 
additional services, including training, consulting, tailor-made dispute 
resolution and assistance in getting financial support and acts as a hub 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 119 Stockholm Convention, preambular paragraph 9, which states: “Recognizing that this 
Convention and other international agreements in the field of trade and the environment are 
mutually supportive.” 
 120 Doha Declaration, para. 31 states “[w]ith a view to enhancing the mutual 
supportiveness of trade and environment, we agree to negotiations, without prejudging their 
outcome, on (1) the relationship between the existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations 
set out in Multilateral Environmental Agreements;” see also Pieter Jan Kuijper University of 
Amsterdam, ICTSD Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of International Trade ICTSD 
Programme on Dispute Settlement Conflicting Rules and Clashing Courts The Case of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Free Trade Agreements and the WTO 41 (2010), Issue 
Paper No. 10, (noting that multilateral environmental agreements “have been joined by around 
170 states, considerably more than the numbers of Members of the WTO. Moreover, the past 
decades have witnessed not only a proliferation of multilateral environmental agreements, but 
also of annexes and protocols to those, rendering the party-non-party divide and the resulting 
legal issues even more complicated.”) Id. at 15. 
 121 Disclosure requirements in multilateral environmental agreements can cause friction 
with trade objectives, Pieter Jan Kuijper University of Amsterdam, ICTSD Dispute Settlement 
supra note 120 at 16.  
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connecting various critical partners, with WIPO facilitating policy 
dialogue and networking.122 
 
There may also be common ground with which to cooperate with the World Bank’s 
efforts to create a “decentralized knowledge platform for low emission development that 
can provide upstream advice and support to developing countries.”123 Inclusive, 
collaborative governance of transboundary natural resources continues to challenge the 
international community. Trade law, IP law, labor law, national security law, climate law, 
and energy law are among the fragmented sectors that impact environmentally sound 
innovation diffusion. Public-private coordination can enhance renewable energy and 
efficiency technologies to least developed countries. The technology mechanism can 
bring together a broad array of stakeholders to optimize innovation and diffusion through 
a network of collaborative innovation hubs and public sector incentives. 
 Increasing the renewable energy mix will require policies to stimulate changes in 
the energy system.124 The IPCC notes that monetizing given energy source’s external 
costs would enhance renewable energy’s relative competitiveness given the negative 
externalities associated with fossil fuels. Moreover, value depends on more than simply 
market cost. Peak electricity demand is just one driver from an array of economic, social 
and environmental considerations that go into energy choices.125 The IPCC calls for 
renewable energy specific policies regarding R&D, demonstration and deployment with 
which to level the playing field among energy sources.126 Broadly sharing knowledge on 
renewable energy can help the pace and scope of its diffusion to least developed 
countries.127   
 In an effort to map an accessible climate technology landscape, the European 
Patent Office has begun sharing information regarding a new classification scheme for 
patents in climate change mitigation technologies. The European Patent Office has 
created a detailed taxonomy based on the technical attributes of clean energy 
technologies.128 An increased understanding of environmentally sound technology 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 122 WIPO INPUT FOR THE COMPILATION DOCUMENT FOR THE PREPARATORY PROCESS OF 
THE UN CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT supra 40 note at 9 (describing WIPO 
cooperation with WHO on medicines); see generally Katherine Strandburg, Evolving Innovation 
Paradigms And The Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861 (2009) (Arguing 
for an expanded role for WIPO.)  
 123 World Bank Group, THE ROAD TO RIO+20 AND BEYOND supra 43 note at 3.  
 124 IPCC Zero Order Draft supra note 2 at 9. 
 125 Id. at 11 (others include “R&D, economies of scale, deployment-oriented learning, and 
increased market competition”) 
 126 Id. at 23 (“Policies include regulations such as feed-in-tariffs, quotas, priority grid 
access, building mandates, biofuel blending requirements, and bioenergy sustainability criteria. 
Other policy categories are fiscal incentives such as tax policies and direct government payments 
such as rebates and grants; and public finance mechanisms such as loans and guarantees.  
Policies can be sector specific and can be implemented on the local, state/provincial, national and 
in some cases regional level and can be complemented by bilateral, regional and international 
cooperation.”) Id. 
 127 Id. at 23. 
 128 Konstantinos Karachalios (EPO)  Nikolaus Thumm (EPO); Ahmed Abdel Latif  
(ICTSD), Pedro Roffe (ICTSD); Benjamin Simmons (UNEP); Tahir Amin (Initiative for 
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demand factors, the impact of public sector support, and successfully commercialized 
environmentally sound innovations could flesh out the innovation landscape.129 Much 
collaborative work remains to be done regarding the impact of IPRs on environmentally 
sound technology transfer to least developed countries. Empirical research can provide 
preliminary maps with which to formulate policy questions and optimize public-private 
innovation and technology transfer decisions that genuinely address economic, social, 
and environmental sustainability.   
 Steven Ferrey has evaluated emerging developing country technology transfer 
case studies, considering principles shared by small successful renewable energy 
programs.130 These include: (1) interconnection requirements, (2) renewable portfolio 
standards, (3) net metering, (4) bid security bonds, (5) and transparent regulatory 
processes.131 
 The stability, scope and industrialized nature of domestic markets are intertwined 
factors that, together with IPRs, impact the global diffusion of environmentally sound 
technologies. The international community should prioritize global diffusion of mature, 
off-patent environmentally sound technologies. As the Rio Declaration clarified, “[a] 
large body of useful technological knowledge lies in the public domain. There is a need 
for the access of developing countries to such technologies as are not covered by patents 
or lie in the public domain.”132 Patent offices can provide leadership to facilitate in-depth 
analysis of patents filed in each environmentally sound sector and identify innovation 
dynamics. Beyond the private sector’s interests in not sharing IPRs and licensing 
information that can advantage competitors, sharing knowledge on innovation dynamics 
is both complex and expensive if for no other reason than it requires coordination within 
and among international and regional institutions, state, academic, private sector and 
NGOs. Collaboration is underway and would benefit from a greater resource base with 
which to facilitate diffusion of climate friendly innovations to least developed countries. 
 Within the patent framework, Joshua Sarnoff recommends “protecting 
experimentation, sequential innovation, and inter-operability of innovations with the 
developed patented technologies.”133 Alternatives to the patent system include public 
procurement, establishing constructed commons, or placing certain innovation in the 
public domain.134 Beyond the patent framework, Ashford and Hall’s work considers a 
range of instruments, including university innovation diffusion through hybrid R&D 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Medicines, Access and Knowledge (I-MAK)), PATENTS AND CLEAN ENERGY: BRIDGING THE GAP 
BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND POLICY FINAL REPORT 75 (2010) UNEP, EPO and ICTSD) available at  
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2010/09/study-patents-and-clean-energy_159101.pdf. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Steven Ferrey, INTERNATIONAL ALCHEMY WITHIN THE POST-COPENHAGEN WORLD: 
TRANSFORMING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACROSS TWO HUNDRED DIVERGENT ECONOMIES, 
34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 319 (2011) (discussing international lessons in 
renewable development technology transfer). 
 131 Id.  
 132 Rio Declaration’s Basis for Action, paragraph 9 supra note 13. 
 133 Sarnoff, THE PATENT SYSTEM supra note 77 at 308 ((“Substantial theoretical and 
empirical uncertainties remain regarding whether the patent system is the best method of 
promoting innovation and dissemination of technologies.”) Id.  
 134 Id. at 308 (describing the similarities of climate innovation to medicines and 
biodiversity human rights implications of granting IPRs)  
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centers; grants, subsidies, and tax incentives; removing innovation regulatory barriers; 
and energy pricing.135  
 UN Secretary General Ban-ki-moon states that “[g]overnments should move 
towards the transparent disclosure of all subsidies, and should identify and remove those 
subsidies which cause the greatest detriment to natural, environmental and social 
resources.”136 The IEA estimates that direct fossil fuel consumption subsidies totaled 
$312 billion world-wide in 2009.137 It is no small task to overcome such a powerful 
collective action problem as climate change, or engage constructively with influential 
vested interests. In particular, transnational, interdisciplinary, inclusive decision-making 
takes time and resources. Yet, building upon existing collaborative networks can 
facilitate greater policy coherence among university innovation centers, individual 
innovators and stakeholders, private firms, civil society, governments, and nested 
networks within and partnered with the United Nations system.  
 Encouraging locally useful human capital can help tailor innovations to 
community needs through local adaptations. University exchanges138 can help foster this 
community development, perhaps building upon existing agricultural extension programs 
but with much deeper community involvement in the design end of programs. These 
relationships can encourage interactions between change agents, community participants, 
and governments. University involvement can also bring in scientists to participate in 
open innovation. Local least developed country entrepreneurs are ill positioned to join 
international patent pools, irrespective of how useful the outcome innovations may be for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 135 Nicholas Ashford and Ralph Hall, The Importance of Regulation-Induced Innovation 
for Sustainable Development, SUSTAINABILITY 2011, 3, 270-292; doi:10.3390/su3010270, 
Jan. 19, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/3/1/270/pdf (“Government 
initiatives, policies, and instruments must be integrated so as to  co-optimize‘ multiple goals—to 
foster innovation for sustainability and to use environmental, health, and safety regulation as well 
as trade policy to stimulate and encourage that innovation.”) 
 136 UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON GLOBAL 
SUSTAINABILITY, RESILIENT PEOPLE RESILIENT PLANET: A FUTURE WORTH CHOOSING at 11; see 
also Mohamed El-Ashry, Senior Fellow, UN Foundation & Chairman, REN21, SCALING-UP 
RENEWABLES FOR ENERGY SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMEN, Keynote 
Address at Asia Clean Energy Forum, ADB, Manila, June, 22, 2011 at 8 (“We need to phase out 
fossil fuel subsidies and use taxes and regulations to promote market conditions in which 
renewable energy can compete but without shifting a disproportionate share of additional burden 
to the poor.”) Id.  
 137 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT, AND WORLD BANK, THE SCOPE OF FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSIDIES IN 2009 AND A 
ROADMAP FOR PHASING OUT FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES, IAE, OECD, and World Bank Joint 
Report Prepared for the G-20 Summit, Seoul (Paris, Washington, DC, November 11, 2010) (“the 
distribution impacts need to be carefully considered While many studies have shown that the bulk 
of fossil fuel subsidies disproportionally favor the upper middle classes, some are effectively 
targeted at providing for the basic energy needs of the poor 51 According to research by the 
Global Subsidies Initiative, fossil fuel subsidies reform will be more successful if it takes these 
impacts into account and, among other things, “includes complementary policies that offset any 
undesired secondary impacts (such as welfare support for the poor, programs to help industries 
restructure, or longer-term strategies to diversify the national energy supply) Id. 
 138 c.f. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 6 (National Academies Press 2010).  
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their impoverished communities. Collaborative R&D in these communities can help 
diffuse environmentally sound technologies where countries lack funding, R&D capacity, 
licensing agreements, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
 Jurisdictions at all scales should coordinate adaptive renewable energy policies 
with other energy and non-energy policies. For instance, water intensity should not be 
exchanged for energy intensity. Slow yet steady progress is underway to map climate 
technology governance. Legal measures such as feed-in tariffs, renewable portfolio 
standards, and green building standards can enhance funding and steady implementation 
of innovation diffusion. Technology Needs Assessments, combined with renewable 
energy legal incentives, are establishing enabling conditions for developing countries to 
host environmentally sound technologies.  
 Capacity building measures as Technology Needs Assessments and 
renewable/efficiency laws cannot single handedly sustain technology transfer, however. 
The intellectual property literature suggests that while greater empirical research is 
necessary, legal plurality with regard to IPR recognition has slowed some corporate 
willingness to license technologies in states.139 
 The traditional theory of granting IPRs relies upon markets to optimize 
equilibrated supply and demand. Absent market failure, this approach can sustain global 
trade without public sector tweaking. Yet, where market failures exist, public sector 
incentives can help establish markets for such products as renewable energy and 
efficiency technologies where least developed countries are not able to represent their 
demand in the form of ability to pay nor are suppliers willing to invest due to IPR 
protection and such non- market factors as the stability of a given country.  
 While it is a challenge to fund global innovation and diffusion, linking existing 
innovation capacity allows the climate technology network to build upon existing 
university, public sector, development bank, private knowledge goods, NGO monitoring, 
and individual innovators in a Linux-style approach that builds upon best practices within 
the expanding public domain. It is legally well-positioned to gather the climate 
innovators and coordinate with states and other stakeholders. With this trampoline, the 
technology network may be able to catapult renewable and efficiency knowledge goods 
into a global public domain. There is a strong argument for prioritizing scaling up the 
Technology Mechanism to be able to play a catalytic role in innovation and diffusion 
through funding and broad participation. Why not leave it to existing well-resourced 
private companies with the capacity to expand production without public intervention in 
market disequilibrium? IPRs are an already established and growing dominant model. 
That said, IPRs play an important but limited role in incentivizing public knowledge 
goods.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 139 Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation Of Intellectual Property Rights By Corporations 
And Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2012) (“studies indicate that IPRs, particularly 
patents, play a role in the furtherance of technology markets. However, conclusions about the 
degree to which IPRs further the technology markets and/or are vital to technology transfers 
differ somewhat among these studies.”) Id. at 10; see also William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 369 (2011)(“requiring patent applicants and owners to pay for other government 
programs operates as a tax on one aspect of innovation and thus likely slows technological 
progress.”) Id. at 409. 
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 Leaving the private sector to engage in corporate responsibility and voluntary 
measures to diffuse EST through such approaches as the Eco Patent Commons may not 
achieve climate mitigation and adaptation in a timely manner. Similarly, leaving least 
developed countries to innovate in their own timeframe to the best of their indigenous 
capacity is also unlikely to occur in a timely manner.140  
 Beyond the market failure of negative externalities of non-renewable emissions, 
market failure also challenges jurisdictions to optimize knowledge production since  
Innovator’s incentives are generally tied to recognition and remuneration. Policy-makers 
can customize incentives to given kinds of innovation processes in response to the 
enhanced collaborative innovation that has altered the traditional thinking about how to 
recognize innovation.  
 Christopher Leslie explains that “[p]atent law does not exist in a vacuum. It is but 
one component of a country's overall innovation policy. Other elements include 
government contracts for, and subsidization of, both basic and industry-specific research. 
Antitrust law, too, should be considered a major component of national innovation 
policy.”141 Existing innovation collaboration communities include the Eco-Patent 
Commons. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development hosts the Eco-
Patent Commons in which company commitments to license environmental patents on a 
royalty-free basis. It has been growing since 2008 on an open source model. This model 
allows use of its innovations but only so long as such use remains open to others.142 
Similarly, the GreenXchange has been working with the Creative Commons since 2010 
on model licenses.143  	   I argue that international network coordination can help such property rights 
approaches complement non-property rights approaches to sustainability generally. 
Dynamic network governance can also work at appropriate scales of climate-energy-
water coordination among economic, environmental and human rights sectors of the 
international community. The next section will consider coordination among two of these 
dimensions, considering trade and environment cooperation that balances free trade with 
environmental integrity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 140 Global Warming Twenty Years Later: Tipping Points Near: Briefing Before the H. 
Select Comm. on Energy Indep. and Global Warming, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Dr. 
James E. Hansen,  Dir., NASA Goddard Inst. for Space Studies), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/ 2008/TwentyYearsLater_20080623.pdf; see also A Special 
Report on Forests: Something Stirs, But to Save the Forests, the World Needs to Find Somewhere 
Else to Grow Its Food, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17062727 (The global population is likely to increase by half 
over the next forty years); see also IPCC, Technical Paper on Climate Change and Water, 28th 
Sess., Apr. 9–10, 2008, at 32, U.N. Doc. IPCC-XXVIII/Doc.13 (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www. 
ipcc.ch/meetings/session28/doc13.pdf (explaining that wet regions of the world will become 
wetter and dry regions will become dryer, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change.) Id. 
 141 Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust And Patent Law As Component Parts Of Innovation 
Policy, 34 J. Corp. L. 1259 (2009) (noting that “Patent law, however, cannot respond adequately 
to these forms of misconduct because it is not fundamentally designed to police and punish patent 
holders; rather, it focuses primarily on policing and punishing infringers.”) Id. at 1285. 
 142 Eco-Patent Commons supra note 83. 
 143 Id. 
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A. Trade and Environment Policy Coherence 
 
 A full analysis of trade and environmental law coordination is beyond the scope 
of this Article but I will offer a few considerations with regard to cooperation to identify 
gaps and conflicts between the trade and environment international legal regimes.  
 The UN Trade and Environment Development Account Project argues that: 
 
[t]he Doha Ministerial Declaration of the Member States of the World 
Trade Organization emphasises the importance of the trade and 
environment nexus in paragraphs 31-33 by: a) mandating further 
negotiations; b) instructing the Committee on Trade and Environment to 
give attention to issues including the effect of environmental  
measures on market access; and c) recognising the importance of technical 
assistance and capacity building in trade and environment to developing 
countries.144 
Similarly, the UNFCCC also has existing provisions upon which to enhance policy 
coherence, stating: 
 
[c]ooperation with relevant international organizations, such as with 
scientific bodies, UN agencies and other conventions, is an important 
dimension of the Convention process. The Convention itself calls on the 
COP to "seek and utilize … the services and cooperation of, and 
information provided by, competent international organizations and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies" (Article 7.2 (l)). The 
aim is to ensure that the Convention process has the best scientific and 
other relevant information available. The COP and its subsidiary bodies 
also seek to ensure that the climate change related activities of other 
international organizations are coherent with the Convention process and 
respond to the needs of the Parties, and that potential linkages and 
synergies with climate change related matters are appropriately taken into 
account.145 
 
Best practice lessons may be gleaned from the work of the Joint Liaison Group of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 144 UN Trade and Environment Development Account Project, Project Overview 
 available at http://www.un-trade-environment.org/project_overview.html (noting further that 
“Millennium Development Goal 7 calls upon the global community to ensure environmental 
sustainability.”) Id.  
 145 UNFCCC, COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, (2012) available 
at 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/cooperation_with_international_organizations/items/25
33.php (“Relevant linkages relate, for example, to cross-cutting thematic areas and activities 
under the three Rio Conventions.”) Id. 
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Desertification, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.146 
The fact that these are not only all environmental instruments, but also siblings of the 
1992 Rio Summit, significantly weakens the proposal that policy coherence among the 
Rio governance bodies can inform trade and the environment coordination. Moreover, 
enhancing trade and environment intra-network interaction still leaves the long shadow of 
a myriad of foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaty (BIT) provisions that 
involve head spinning complexity and lack of transparency.147  
 Coordinating public good climate mitigation efforts in the face of free-rider 
inclinations is further complicated by the difficulty in valuing transboundary harms and 
pricing greenhouse gas emissions.148    
 How then can the international community build upon these BITS and specialized 
law to overcome the sense that fragmentation weakens rather than provides resilience? 
Innovation (both governance and technological innovation) thrives in settings with 
sufficient structure to provide basic thresholds of governance while enough leeway with 
which to develop new best practices. This is the dynamic network governance challenge. 
The sea is wide and where is the boat? It is no small task to address international 
fragmentation and this Article can only make preliminary proposals in the context of EST 
innovation cooperation. That said, the international community through the help of 
conscientious and representative intra-network collaboration can increase cross-regime 
efforts to address gaps and conflicts as well as build upon synergies. 
 The following sections will consider three policy coherence approaches: (1) a 
freestanding instrument, (2) WTO jurisprudence regarding infant renewable industry 
subsidies, and (3) climate technology network coordination. 
 
  
1. Free Standing Innovation Sharing Agreement 
 
 In 2009, I recommended that states ratify an environmentally sound technology 
transfer treaty (ESTT).149 The ESTT still represents a straightforward approach from a 
theoretical standpoint. Yet, despite progress on a mercury treaty, U.S. insistence on very 
strong IPR in the last several years impacts the ability to ratify or implement a 
freestanding treaty on technology transfer, in the energy sector or otherwise. For better or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 146 See e.g. Joint Liaison Group of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Ninth meeting, New York, 14 May 2009, available at  
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/cooperation_with_international_organizations/app
lication/pdf/jlg-09-report-en.pdf. 
 147  See Katia Fach Gómez, LATIN AMERICA AND ICSID: DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH? 17 L. 
& BUS. REV. AM. 195 (2011) (discussing the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)) 
196; see also Uché U. Ewelukwa, SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT: THE GOOD, THE BAD 
AND THE UGLY-- AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 513 (2011). (discussing China 
and Africa innovation coordination). 
 148 MASKUS AND OKEDIJI, supra 75 at 20 (“Together, the current global IP system is a 
mosaic of blurred and indistinct lines between ownership rights and public interest goals in the 
implementation of IPRs.”) Id. 
 149 See generally Elizabeth Burleson, “Energy Policy, Intellectual Property and 
Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change,” supra note 32.  
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worse, discourse on technology transfer has morphed into innovation sharing 
coordination. This development is more collaborative but less rights based. This Article 
reaches the qualified conclusion that a long-range climate/trade solution involves legally 
binding country commitments to environmentally sound technology transfer that can be 
complemented by regional and/or sectoral protocols or memorandum of understanding 
agreements to flesh out ambiguous language.  
 International laws with technology transfer provisions include: UNFCCC Article 
4.5,150 TRIPS Agreement Article 66.2, Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Article 
16,151 and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants Article 12(4)152 
Consequently, it would be useful at this juncture to provide draft article language for an 
EST innovation agreement, without prejudice to the final outcome with regard to the 
legally binding nature of such an instrument. 
 While Kuijper suggests that the WTO has recognized multilateral environmental 
agreements as lex specialis153 carved out of WTO law, he evaluates the remaining gaps in 
coordination among trade and environmental law and policy.154 Kuijper highlights the 
danger to sustainable development and the functioning of multilateral environmental 
agreements as deference is given to WTO trade forums with which to settle disputes. 
Both conflicts of norms where substantive conflicts arise between international regimes 
and conflicts of jurisdictions in which it is unclear who should resolve the issue make 
trade and the environment coordination crucial to addressing climate change. 155 Beyond 
evaluating jus cogens,156 UN Charter,157 and ILC guidance on harmonization and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,158 Kuijper suggests that the WTO join 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 150 UNFCCC 4.5 supra note 20. 
 151 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
 152 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532. 
 153 Lex specialis is a Latin phrase for “law governing a specific subject matter.” 
 154 Pieter Jan Kuijper University of Amsterdam, ICTSD Dispute Settlement at 41 (“The 
newer type of framework approach to MEAs as applied in the areas of biodiversity and climate 
change creates more complicated problems. This is because the WTO dispute settlement system 
has to react to changing approaches to very broad categories of products, the concrete 
manifestations of which are still unknown (biotechnological products and their trade) or to 
approaches to addressing a truly global problem that may take many forms, including the creation 
of new markets, such as emission trading rights.”) Id. c.f. JOSH EDERINGTON, SYMPOSIUM: 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT SHOULD TRADE AGREEMENTS INCLUDE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY? (2009) Oxford University Press at 98, available at 
http://content.ebscohost.com/pdf23_24/pdf/2010/5309/01Jan10/47988408.pdf?T=P&P=AN&K=
47988408&S=R&D=eih&EbscoContent=dGJyMNLr40SeqK44y9fwOLCmr0qep7RSsKi4TLK
WxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGptkmzrbVNuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA (discussing negotiation 
and enforcement linkage issues if climate and trade rules were to be integrated.) 
 155 Pieter Jan Kuijper University of Amsterdam, ICTSD Dispute Settlement supra note 
120 at 1.  
 156 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT].  
 157 UN Charter Article 103 states: “in the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail,” available 
at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. 
 158 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties supra note 156; see also 
THE	  GEORGETOWN	  INT’L	  ENVTL.	  LAW	  REVIEW	  	   	  	   38	  
consultations underway among for instance the European Courts and engage in broader 
trade and environment coordination with other international regimes.159  
 I propose that coordinating reciprocal protocols might provide the best means by 
which to accomplish specific agreement, e.g. subsidies for renewable energy promotion 
without trade law implications, a method utilized in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative Context. Each participating state established legislation within its own state 
based upon a collective memorandum of understanding. Together they carry out a 
regional market to reduce GHG emissions.  
 At the international trade level, member states to the WTO could agree to 
amending trade rules to better reflect shared vision to incentivize environmentally sound 
innovation and diffusion. International regimes could harmonize around using the 
Agenda 21 definition of the term environmentally sound. Further, nested networks could 
help build consensus upon detailed criteria to fill gaps and avert conflicts between 
supporting environmentally sound innovation and unduly impacting free trade. Ongoing 
work on lifecycle analysis could be folded into this process.  
 Yet, if subsidies generally and agricultural subsidies in particular are an area 
where the WTO has yet to facilitate broad international agreement, then how can trade 
law effectively incentivize a transition to environmentally sound energy policy, 
production, and use? What are the trade costs of strict climate mitigation? Putting a price 
on carbon has become shorthand for effectively internalizing the costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions. If subsidizing infant renewable industries can be viewed by the WTO as 
within the existing realm of GATT Article XX environmental requirements then WTO 
jurisprudence can help enforce effective environmental measures, catching only the 
genuinely fraudulent protective trade measures that try to discriminate on the basis of 
environmental criteria without achieving an actual environmental benefit. Consider the 
following questions:  
 (1) Is the WTO the right decision-making body to make such environmental 
decisions? The WTO is not a general international decision-making body. It was 
established and remains predominantly focused upon free trade and reducing such trade 
barriers as subsidies. While the WTO has a side provision on the environment, the 
competencies of the WTO are in a field that can be at odds with environmental measures. 
In balancing economic efficiency, equity, and sustainability, the WTO may not have the 
best frame with which to make difficult decisions to mitigate GHGs when doing so may 
impact free trade.  
 (2) Can the WTO help identify what the trade costs of mitigating climate change 
will be? While Seattle and Genoa demonstrations show that not everyone is in favor of 
expanding international trade, the aim of the WTO to avert another global great 
depression is one worth balancing with the need to mitigate greenhouse gasses.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Henning Grosse Ruse-khan, The International Law Relation Between Trips and Subsequent 
Trips-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding Trips Flexibilities? 18 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 325 (2011) (discussing harmonious interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT); see also Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration 
and Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 279 (2005). 
 159 Pieter Jan Kuijper University of Amsterdam, ICTSD Dispute Settlement supra note 
120 at 42.  
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 The fact that environmental subsidies to support infant renewable sectors may be 
misused as a loophole to discriminate against foreign trade requires conscientious 
scrutiny, not prohibition of environmental subsidies. Such subsidies can be one of the 
most powerful public sector tools with which to mitigate greenhouse gasses. The WTO 
offers an existing judicial context in which to make case-by-case determinations on the 
nature of subsidization, environmental benefit, and discriminatory effect on trade. It is 
unclear to what degree the WTO is standing in the way of addressing climate change and 
whether the regime’s overlap is a de minimums or a substantial obstacle to effectively 
addressing climate change. 
 Policy coordination involves recognizing when a free trade consideration should 
be prioritized and when an environmental or human rights provision should be prioritized. 
Economic growth generally and trade in particular depend upon a stable climate. A stable 
climate depends upon balancing development and sustainability. The international 
community may not need to prioritize wholesale the climate over trade or trade over 
climate stability. Rather, multilateral cooperation should expand the existing international 
legal framework to address energy. The issue can be addressed through a free standing 
instrument, preferably binding, but at least through a memorandum of understanding on 
environmentally sound energy technology transfer. It could set forth a process for 
selecting decision-makers that represent both trade and environmental experts. 
Furthermore, it could set out criteria with which to weigh the trade impact and 
environmental/social impact of an issue such as China’s subsidization of solar panel 
production. 
 In the meantime, multilateral collaboration among North-South innovation hubs 
can perhaps avoid trade implications of public support to environmentally sound 
innovation and diffusion. If done effectively and at scale, the UNFCCC Technology 
Mechanism can likely incentivize climate mitigation in a manner that does not impact 
trade law. Such energy innovation hubs are not mutually exclusive with extending WTO 
treaty language to directly address environmentally sound energy trade.  
 Based upon harmonization theory under the Vienna Convention,160 one plausible 
approach would involve climate law extending to take on the climate 
mitigation/adaptation issues that appear to implicate trade law. The UNFCCC predates 
the WTO but not the GATT. It is not clear which international regime should receive 
deference if a conflict of laws arises. Therefore, proactive policy coherence initiatives are 
warranted. Just as U.S. transgovernmental networks hammered out an off-shore energy 
Memorandum of Understanding (albeit in a much narrower substantive realm), the WTO 
and UNFCCC can agree to grant each other deference in given circumstances or agree to 
broad deference in the trade or climate direction based upon the greater public good of 
one over the other. The WTO dispute system offers a robust yet trade-focused forum with 
which to consider case-by-case disputes. Technology network coordination could involve 
broadening the judicial frame when cases have climate implications rather than relying 
upon trade exceptions and flexibilities.  
 Alternatively, a balanced freestanding instrument could involve reciprocal 
responsibilities on the part of members of each international legal regime to implement a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 160 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 156.  
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joint judicial review mechanism that is not hosted by one or the other regime.161 A high 
level panel could compose an ad hoc trade-environment-human rights judicial review 
mechanism (analogous to the post conflict war tribunals or Iran claims tribunal) tasked 
with bilateral specific dispute resolution or multilateral advisory capacity. In other words, 
thematic treaty body and international organization networks can play a catalytic role in 
coordinating environmentally sound technology innovation and diffusion.  
 
 
2. WTO Consideration of Infant Renewable Subsidies 
 
 As this article goes to press, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) is stepping into the trade and environment void by establishing an 
international forum to address disputes. By meeting twice a year, the forum can 
contribute to coordinating initiatives and seek shared understandings. Transnational 
cooperation to address climate change by incentivizing infant renewables does not 
require overly restrictive local input requirements that give local producers a trade 
advantage. Economic tools used to internalize environmental externalities need not favor 
local job markets to be effective climate responses. More often, greenhouse gas emissions 
fees and markets raise costs for domestic and regional actors. This is the case with cap 
and trade as well as carbon taxes. UNCTAD trade and environment coordination 
assistance may contribute to finding conflict avoidance measures but be less qualified to 
assess the economic and environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes and cap and trade 
programs, both given the UNCTAD mandate and the short timeframe in which such 
economic tools have been utilized to address climate change. WTO has responded 
favorably to the UNCTAD offer to coordinate and has agreed to participate informally at 
an expert level to explore reconciling environmental governance with trade rules. A key 
element in such coordination is equal stature among economic and environmental 
governance realms. If trade actors dominate coordination then interaction may negatively 
impact environmental measures.  
 Marie Wilke’s work on WTO subsidy law seeks to clarify what constitutes a 
subsidy and which subsidies are prohibited in the context of feed-in tariffs, concluding 
that the degree to which feed-in tariffs conflict with WTO rules depends upon the given 
design/implementation of each program.162 The roughly seventy-five federal or sub-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 161 This is perhaps more easily done at the EU scale, see Matthew Rimmer, A Proposal 
for a Clean Technology Directive: European Patent Law and Climate Change, 3 RENEWABLE 
ENERGY L. & POL'Y REV. 195 (2011) (“This article charts the conflicted, dissonant policies of the 
European Union towards intellectual property and climate change.”) Id. 
 162 MARIE WILKE, FEED-IN TARIFFS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND WTO SUBSIDY 
RULES AN INITIAL LEGAL REVIEW viii (2011) International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy; see 
also Richard H. Steinberg, The Hidden World of WTO Governance: a Reply to Andrew Lang and 
Joanne Scott, E.J.I.L. 2009, 20(4), 1063-1071 (2012) Oxford University Press (discussing 
international administrative law in the context of the WTO); c.f. see generally, Daniel Bodansky, 
Multilateral Climate Efforts Beyond the UNFCCC International (2011), Center for Climate and 
Energy Solutions, (noting that the “UNFCCC regime could explicitly direct that a particular 
aspect of the climate change issue be pursued in a different forum. In this case, the relationship 
between the UNFCCC regime and outside work would be one of delegation.”) Id. at 2.  
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federal feed-in tariffs generally involve purchasing and transmission guarantees for 
eligible renewable energy producers, often including homeowners and businesses. This 
approach to incentivizing renewable energy may be impacted by the dispute currently 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) considering Ontario’s domestic content 
requirement within its feed-in tariff.163 With regard to renewable subsidies more 
generally, the United States has charged China with illegal wind and solar subsidies while 
China has charged the United States with improper wind, solar, and hydroelectric 
incentives to energy producers in five states.164 Operationalizing trade law as a means of 
addressing climate mitigation can occur by coordinating climate mitigation measures 
with free trade measures in a manner that facilitates global trade and renewable energy 
sharing.  
 A freestanding agreement may be the most straightforward but politically 
constrained approach. The WTO has a trade focus but is increasingly making renewable 
subsidy decisions. Ideally, these cases may be able to establish a clear standard for 
environmentally sound energy diffusion given GATT Article XX jurisprudence on 
environmental protections.165 Environment-trade regime coordination should involve 
network coordination to fill existing gaps on what environmental measures may run afoul 
of international economic law. Review of environmental measures in international 
economic judicial forums can result in standards for trade in climate friendly innovations. 
The open question is whether these will be climate friendly standards or overly restrictive 
standards. Including climate experts as decision-makers in cases could increase the 
changes that the trade-environment issues would result in balanced decisions. A 
freestanding instrument among international legal regimes could help specify the 
provisions of climate expert representation in trade-environmental jurisprudence so that 
member states of each respective regime would be going forward based upon agreement 
with the arrangement. In the interim, the best opportunity to ramp up environmentally 
sound innovation and diffusion is likely to involve linking and coordinating climate 
technology network innovation hubs.  
 
3. Optimizing Environmentally Sound Innovation Hubs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 163 Japan v Canada WTO Dispute, available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/a1s1p1_e.htm 
 164 Daniel Pruzin, U.N. Agency Sets Up Forum to Address Conflicts Between Trade, 
Environment Rules, BNA 188 DEN A-6 available at 
http://news.bna.com/deln/DELNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=28117328&vname=dennotallissues
&jd=a0d4v1x2q7&split=0 (“A number of high-profile trade and environment disputes have 
recently been brought before WTO dispute panels, including complaints by the United States, 
European Union, Japan, and Mexico against China's export restrictions on raw materials and rare 
earths, and a joint EU-Japanese complaint against alleged discriminatory sourcing requirements 
and illegal subsidies in Ontario's green energy program. In addition, Argentina initiated WTO 
dispute proceedings Aug. 17 targeting Spanish rules requiring that quotas for biofuels used in 
transportation be met exclusively with EU fuel.” 	   165	  See e.g. Report of the Panel, United States--Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶¶ 5.14-
.15, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (unadopted), reprinted in 
30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I]; Report of the Panel, United States--
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.9, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (unadopted), reprinted in 33 
I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II].	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 While innovation involves an entire process, from creative spark to diffusion, my 
use of innovation and diffusion is an explicit effort to highlight the global diffusion 
challenge. It is also a reflection on the evolution of the discourse away from technology 
transfer – still important for its hard law character but no longer reflective of the 
transition to collaborative innovation initiatives. 
 Optimizing knowledge networking infrastructure can often involve sharing 
public-sector information and providing guidelines for public-private partnerships.166 
Coordination with UNESCO’s Community Learning Centre (CLC) Project could be 
catalytic for both community education centers and innovation.167 This partnership could 
also fold into UNESCO efforts underway on the United Nations Decade of Education for 
Sustainable Development.168 Coordination could also build upon UNESCO’s leadership 
initiating and sustaining the Water and Climate Dialogue through UN-Water.169 This 
section considers climate innovation center and network design.  
 If the energy debate has splintered into sawdust, then it may be possible to 
creatively make use of the sawdust to coax a phoenix to rise. Law can foster energy 
innovation through network coordination. The new climate technology network augments 
current international economic law by offering innovation hubs with which to expand the 
legal regime addressing climate change. This network can be a catalyst for enhancing 
inspiration, knowledge sharing, and funding mechanisms with which to craft a path 
forward.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 166 OECD SECRETARIAT: INPUTS TO THE RIO+20 COMPILATION DOCUMENT supra note at 
4; see also OECD, FOSTERING INNOVATION FOR GREEN GROWTH (2011), available at 
www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3746,en_2649_37465_48593219_1_1_1_37465,00.html 
OECD (2011); see also OECD, INVENTION AND TRANSFER OF ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES 
(2010) available at 
www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_37465_48792476_1_1_1_37465,00.htmlOECD.  
 167 R. Manowalailao, D. M. Shibly, D. M. Shibly, UNESCO/R. Manowalailao, 
COMMUNITY LEARNING CENTRES: ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT (2012) 
UNESCO/Isamabad 
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002159/215911e.pdf (UNESCO’s 
Community Learning Centre (CLC) Project was launched in 1998 in the framework of the 
UNESCO Asia-Pacific Programme of Education for All (APPEAL). The purpose of CLCs is to 
promote human development by providing opportunities for lifelong learning to all people in 
local communities. CLCs support empowerment, social transformation and improvement of the 
quality of life. The main functions of CLCs are to provide: (a) education and training, (b) 
community information and resource services, (c) community development activities, and (d) co-
ordination and networking.”) Id. 
 168 UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF EDUCATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2005-
2014) EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A MULTIPLE-PERSPECTIVE APPROACH 
EDUCATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN ACTION LEARNING & TRAINING TOOLS (2012) 
UNESCO available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002154/215431e.pdf. 
 169 See UNESCO, WATER AND CLIMATE DIALOGUE ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: 
WHY WE NEED BROADER AND ‘OUT-OF-THE-BOX’ APPROACHES (2008) United Nations World 
Water Assessment Programme available at  
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002115/211591e.pdf (explaining that “[w]ater is the 
primary medium through which climate change influences the Earth’s ecosystems and therefore 
people’s livelihoods and well-being.”) Id.  
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 What will it take for energy innovation to become widespread? The intellectual 
property, economic, and psychology literatures have settled on some best practices with 
regard to enabling conditions. Creativity and peak performance have long been the 
purview of the MIT Media Lab but there is an urgent need to break out of the best 
practices of such research centers and initiate a network of innovation hubs globally. One 
challenge is to integrate one of the most significant findings from psychology of 
creativity research, namely that intrinsically motivated work is more likely to produce 
more creative output than extrinsically motivated work.170 Inventor’s Workshops provide 
transdisciplinary open access to knowledge that allows individuals to become experts 
across multiple domains. This innovation builds upon TechBursts,171 adding a hands-on 
component comparable to instructables.com.172173 Inventor’s Workshops can be gathering 
places, networks of centers, and diverse nurturing communities that span universities and 
extend to peer institutions in order to realize multifaceted collaboration.  
 At the 2012 Durban Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, innovators from 
across sub-Saharan Africa gathered to share their expertise with one another and join 
innovation networks. 174  Recognizing that law can facilitate environmentally sound 
innovation, this analysis considers strategies for network coordination through rich and 
creative transnational engagement.175 
 Copyleft public licenses use intellectual property to facilitate open information 
sharing and can become a model for climate innovation collaboration.176 Some least 
developed countries may already be bypassed by patent filers who sometimes do not even 
file with the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) facility.177 As a result, unfiled 
patents are in the public domain unless a product that includes the innovation makes its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 170 Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and 
the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2007-2008 (2011). 
 171 TechBursts is an approach designed at Georgia Tech in which students create ten 
minute videos that are encapsulating engaging concepts.  See Elizabeth Burleson and Winslow 
Burleson, supra note 32. 	   172	  	  See generally	  instructables.com	  	  
 174 Personal observation.  
 175 FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO ADDRESS 
CLIMATE CHANGE: LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH ix, 1 (2009), http://www.frederickabbott.com/uploads/innovation-and-
technology-transfer-to-address-climate-change.pdf (“There are a number of lessons that can be 
drawn from the public health-related negotiations, at the WTO and other forums, that may be 
useful to developing country negotiators addressing IPRs and climate change.  Some of these 
lessons are relatively straightforward: economic and political power substantially influences the 
outcome of negotiations; the involvement of NGOs and other stakeholders is essential; it is 
important to shape public opinion through effective communication.”) Id. 
 176 MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES 
FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD 34 (Cambridge University Press 2008) (“Yesterday’s innovation 
becomes part of today’s accessible knowledge.”)  Id. at 42, 254.  “[T]he U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office began a pilot program for ‘open peer review . . . .’”  Id. at 113; see also Bayh-
Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006) (applying to inventions made with federal funding); see 
also Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2207 (2009). 
 177 See generally WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) available at 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/ 
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way back to a state in which there is a patent for that invention.178 Furthermore, many 
climate friendly technologies are off patent. Consequently, IPR protection may not be the 
leading obstacle to diffusion of climate friendly technologies to least developed countries.   
 Where IPR remains a core issue for global diffusion of climate friendly 
technologies, innovations strategies that are collaborative and facilitate partnerships may 
be more effective than those that result in sharing of patent databases and patent pooling. 
Just as patent claims may set forth the legal scope of an invention, but not clarify how to 
reproduce it, patent pools may be too exclusive to effectively diffuse climate friendly 
technology to least developed countries.179  
 The open access discussion is expanding with regard to environmentally sound 
innovation diffusion and collaboration. Patent pools, such as the Eco Patent Commons, 
provide an emerging best practice. On the one hand, they still represent a small number 
of patents and lack sufficient know-how or support. On the other hand, they place 
important climate friendly technologies in the public domain. Unfortunately, some of the 
discussion seems focused on “partial solutions, non-solutions, generalities or rhetoric,” 180 
according to Cannady. She explains that “[c]ompulsory licensing is to IP law what 
eminent domain is to real property law: it is generally acknowledged as an essential legal 
doctrine, but no one wants to be the subject of its exercise.”181 Beyond the overly 
confrontational nature of compulsory licensing, it fails to foster the relationships that 
facilitate innovation evolution – where a given invention is improved upon through 
consensual business relationships such as development collaboration or strategic joint 
ventures.182 
 Least developed countries can enhance innovation through strengthening science 
and technology research at the domestic level while collaborating with international 
counter-parts in partnerships that build upon inventions, evolving climate friendly 
innovation architecture. This coordination can be achieved irrespective of capitalist, 
socialist or mixed governance structures. For instance, China has ramped up basic and 
applied research capacity. China now not only leads in core solar technology but is also 
gaining ownership rights to storage and material innovations.183  
 Innovation hubs can look at the real cost of coal, oil, gas, and nuclear energy. 
They can compare advantages of efficiency, storage, distributed power, and the range of 
renewables/alternative energy options. They can facilitate taking innovations out of the 
laboratory and diffusing breakthrough technologies broadly. This should be done through 
commercialization where feasible, and through public sector support.  
 Enhancing access to environmentally sound innovations can build upon models 
provided by institutions, such as WIPO.184 For innovation strategies to resonate in a given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 178 See generally CYNTHIA CANNADY, ACCESS TO CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY BY 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES A PRACTICAL STRATEGY, ICTSD Intellectual Property and Sustainable 
Development Series Issue Paper No. 25. 
 179 Id. at 8. 
 180 Id. at 4. 
 181 Id.  
 182 Id.  
 183 China’s renewable whitepapers can be found at 
www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/whitepapers/. 
 184 WIPO's IP Audit Tool is available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/strategies/audit.html. 
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country, inclusive decision-making should optimize renewable sector focus, support for 
innovation education at all levels, innovation hubs or incubators that gather science, 
technical, legal, and business skill building. Currently, filing fees for climate friendly 
innovation often serves as an obstacle to diffusion. Innovation hubs can help expand 
capacity to draft intellectual property instruments.  
 Innovation hubs can help coordinate public private matching grant programs in 
given sectors and oversee the sometimes extensive process of meeting donor 
requirements. Linking the network of climate technology centers to the Green Climate 
Fund can streamline this process so that human capital can be spent on renewable and 
efficiency innovation rather than largely being lost to seeking financing. To this end, tax 
codes that provide for climate rebates, credits and the like can help facilitate private 
venture capital investment in climate technology for thinly capitalized start-ups in infant 
renewable and efficiency sectors.185 Tax incentives can also facilitate cooperative 
licensing.186 
 Distorted demand-side signals will probably continue until public sector policy 
instruments manage to “meaningfully” price GHG emissions – resulting in suboptimal 
supply of environmentally sound innovations. At the same time, demand for 
environmentally sound innovation that is suitable to given least developed country 
communities will also likely remain weak in the absence of network coordination. An 
IPR and policy incentive smoothie may be needed to achieve broad adoption, adaptation, 
and accessibility187 
 It is not within the scope of this Article to consider the entire global debate on the 
property rights impact upon availability of knowledge goods, but I seek to provide 
preliminary support for the proposition that diversity of policy instruments can optimize 
climate friendly technology access to least developed countries. Between the two camps 
advocating for primary reliance on the existing IPR regime on the one hand and 
government interventions such as compulsory licenses on the other,188 there is an 
emerging discourse on what a broader array of policy instruments might include with 
regard to facilitating EST knowledge good diffusion to developing countries.189  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 185 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Lawrence Pope, DETHRONING LEAR? INCENTIVES TO 
INNOVATE AFTER MEDIMMUNE, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971 (2009) (noting that “[a]s to cash-
flow, licensees that lacked the funds to pay the upfront costs might instead provide for payment 
by negotiable instrument: that is, the licensee would issue a series of negotiable instruments at the 
time the license was entered into with maturity dates apportioned over the life of the license. If 
the patent holder needed funds immediately, it could negotiate these instruments without recourse 
(albeit, most likely at a discount).) Id. at 971, 993. 
 186 CYNTHIA CANNADY, ACCESS TO CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY  
supra note 178 at 22. 
 187 MASKUS AND OKEDIJI, supra 75 at 1 (“From an economic perspective, IPRs are 
primarily policy interventions aimed at achieving private solutions to information-based market 
failures.”) Id. at 13. 
 188 Id. at 5 (2010) (“Compulsory licenses, for example, can be useful in some 
circumstances, particularly where a nation has sufficient economic leverage to induce voluntary 
licensing by merely threatening to grant a CL. However, they are generally of limited use where 
domestic production capacity is limited.”) Id. 
 189 Id.  
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 If leading economies committed to sustaining a high price of emitting greenhouse 
gasses through tax, cap-and-trade, or hybrid methodologies, then the cost of EST 
diffusion may be reduced.190 An across the board, high carbon price, for instance, could 
incentivize R&D competition in a myriad of renewable/efficiency and adaptation 
technologies. 
 Major and emerging economies may benefit most from public-private investment 
guarantees, as well as tax exemptions and rebates, while least developed countries may 
benefit most from the implementation of direct EST diffusion laws.191 Ideally, the 
technology mechanism can facilitate partnerships that collectively form a network for 
ESTs innovation and access that is flexible in its approach given the complexities of local 
conditions, distinctions among EST sectors, and given technologies. It is no small task to 
identify what constitutes EST, let alone tailor EST to community needs. 192    
 The kind of technology transfer/capacity building varies not only based on local 
geography and culture but also on stage of development. In other words, once economies 
of scale have been achieved many renewable technologies will be substantially less 
expensive yet still may be beyond the ability to pay for least developed countries. BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have emerging renewable and/or efficiency 
sectors today and are not strong candidates for receiving free energy products. Yet, 
innovation cooperation among the US, Japan, EU and BRICs countries can further 
dynamic breakout innovations. 
 While states are fiscally constrained in responding to the climate challenge, they 
have the legal capacity to optimize environmentally and socially sound economic growth 
through empowering civil society innovation. What does this look like? BRIC countries 
in particular are in a position to provide innovation leadership. How can the law help 
governments, markets and civil society stretch their perspectives beyond short-term 
economic indicators? As EST market failures become better understood, a dynamic 
discourse is emerging regarding ways for developing countries to venture beyond the 
“comforting shadow” of the OECD IP law expansion path.193 Bringing down the initial 
costs of socially and environmentally sound options can be done through legal and policy 
measures that are mindful of science, equity and environmental thresholds. Feed-in 
tariffs, renewable portfolio standards, and innovation hubs that focus on dynamic 
environmentally sound technology transfer are three ways to facilitate climate-energy far 
sightness. 
 Successful involvement in the contemporary knowledge economy can be based 
upon public sector frameworks that facilitate intangible, nonrivalrous outputs becoming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 190 Id. at 11.  
 191 Id. at 25.  
 192 Id. 
 193 Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property In The Twenty-First Century: Will The 
Developing Countries Lead Or Follow? 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1127 (2009); see also Laurence 
Helfer, Karen Alter and M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of Effective International Adjudication: 
Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103 AMER. J. INT'L 
L. 1, 16-36 (2009) (considering the IP pressures on Latin American states and the resulting 
collective response of the Andean Group). 
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tradable knowledge goods.194 Reichman observes that this can be done through a range of 
measures beyond intellectual property laws and policies.195 Maskus agrees that IP law is a 
starting, not ending point, for innovation law and policy.196  
 
 
V.  Recommendations for Closing the Innovation and Diffusion Gap 
 
 The 2012 United Nations Year on Sustainable Energy catalyzed ongoing energy-
climate cooperation. In the ongoing effort to reach climate consensus, one negotiating 
strategy is to concentrate on what unites rather than divides. Another is to try to bring in 
an unconsidered factor that can provide a win-win scenario. Focusing on environmentally 
sound innovation may be such a pie-growing approach. Inclusive decision-making that 
takes the need for buy-in seriously can build common ground solid enough to support 
climate infrastructure. Stakeholders with large and many small stakes can use these 
stakes to design this infrastructure, rather than hold each other at bay in a standoff. 
Transcending energy insecurity (and the control that it concentrates) can be done through 
design and diffusion of environmentally sound innovations. They will have an impact on 
existing interests, as innovations often do. Rather than clear winners, it seems as though 
climate hold-outs are seeking to ensure that they do not lose their investments, whether 
rationally depended upon or not.197  
 Best practice diffusion requires information sharing, awareness raising, and 
capacity building to realize co-benefits from climate mitigation and human security. The 
new UNFCCC technology mechanism provides an opportunity to diffuse 
environmentally sound climate friendly technologies. The technology mechanism can 
bring together stakeholders and enhance good governance by sharing information and 
making sensible decisions regarding sustainable development.  Decisions informed by an 
understanding of climate justice can bring together dialogue from development, human 
rights, environment, trade, and business communities.  Energy-food-climate security can 
be discussed as the interwoven challenge that it is rather than disparate discussions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 194 Reichman, Intellectual Property In The Twenty-First Century, supra note 193 at 1118; 
see also Meir Pugatch, The Process of Intellectual Property Policy-Making in the 21st Century--
Shifting from a General Welfare Model to a Multi-Dimensional One, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
307 (2009). See generally Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy 
2-3 (2000); Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 Yale L.J. 804 (2008). 
 195 Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property In The Twenty-First Century supra note 
193 at 1118-1122 (in many OECD countries is demonstrating that badly configured, unbalanced, 
over-protectionist IP regimes gradually stifle innovation by making inputs to future innovation 
too costly and too cumbersome to sustain over time. Such regimes also enable large corporations 
that are sometimes slothful innovators to accumulate pools of cross-licensed patents that create 
barriers to entry for the truly innovative small- and medium-sized firms. Properly designed IPRs 
do, however, protect innovative small- and medium-sized firms from the predatory practices of 
their larger competitors.”). Id. at 1122. 
 196 Keith Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, supra note 194 at 
2-3.  
 197 See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 
57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 1978 U.S. 
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Green technology cooperation can help the international community address climate 
destabilization in a sustainable manner. 
More people are venturing beyond their own complex fields into the merging 
aspects of trade-environment-human rights conversation. The open question is how to 
coordinate without simply creating institutions that surpass economies of scale with 
regard to effective implementation. At the same time, substantive coordination among 
water-climate-energy sectors challenges intra-network dialogue generally and the 
capacity of individuals to add value. A great deal of consensus building has produced the 
Climate Technology Mechanism. The next challenge is to incubate and foster this new 
center and network – to become a part of the NGO, University, patent office, and 
individual North-South innovation collaboration. The hosting process itself is becoming a 
collaborative one. With a background in water law, I offer transboundary water compacts 
as a model with which to procedurally coordinate in a way that is still mindful of 
sovereignty. A word of caution that resourcing the technology network will be crucial for 
it to be a catalyst, rather than be constrained on the scale of NAFTA’s CEC, which to this 
day has potential far beyond its fiscal capacity. Elements of good governance from RGGI 
and the Arctic Council may also be useful in making use of best practices in designing a 
vibrant environmentally sound innovation network. Much work remains to be done to 
optimize collaborative, open innovation comparable to user customization of Linux.  
 
Some key elements that the UNFCCC technology network should consider 
include:  
 
• Given the public good nature of EST and related know how, public-private intra-
network cooperation should be prioritized to incentivize EST innovation and 
diffusion. Government engagement in sustaining availability to public goods is 
well established in the areas of public education, environmental regulation, 
infrastructure, and science research. Furthermore, the public sector is best 
positioned to address market failures by balancing efficiency and equity through 
such measures as minimizing negative spill overs and asymmetrical information. 
 
• Developed country, first mover competition in the renewables sector may 
complicate innovation cooperation among the United States, Japan, European 
Union, and BRIC countries but should not impact climate cooperation for least 
developed countries. The international community should take an “all hands on 
deck” approach to ramping up climate mitigation and adaptation technology 
transfer for frontline least developed communities.  
 
• Green technology packages to address climate change can involve open 
innovation, licensing and sharing know-how.198 International and least developed 
country public sector funding could help support green technology package 
royalties. Where possible, Linux-like open source cooperation for green 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 198 See generally Naoto Kuji profile, IP*SEVA stands for Intellectual Property for 
Sustainable Energy Ventures, available at http://ipseva.com/principals/naoto-kuji/ 
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technology diffusion can facilitate North-South dynamics moving beyond the 
model of one-way dependent technology transfer.  
 
• Climate coordination requires greater intra-network cooperation to understand 
trade, equity, and environmental constraints in mitigating and adapting to climate 
change. A broad and deep commitment to sustainable development can be 
enhanced through greater interactions among human rights, environment and 
trade communities. International environmental and human rights lawmaking 
increasingly occurs through consensus building forums that draw upon the 
insights of a wide array of stakeholders. Energy, water, climate, human rights, 
trade, armed conflict, and international organizational law are e-merging (merging 
and emerging) into a powerful collaboration to address core challenges. Spheres 
of law and policy are increasingly overlapping in ways that provide opportunities 
for synergies. Network coordination can further international organization and 
non–state actor involvement in transboundary deliberative decision-making.  
 
• The Green Climate Fund, government EST R&D and diffusion grants, tax credits 
and other policy incentives can enhance public-private catalytic funding. Linking 
these efforts to country compliance to transfer technology to least developed 
countries set forth in TRIPS Article 66.2 could facilitate environmentally sound 
innovation diffusion. In particular, OECD government climate stimulus, perhaps 
via university partnerships, could ramp up EST diffusion efforts to least 
developed countries.  
 
 
• Universities, individual innovators, private firms, civil society, governments, and 
the United Nations can bring environmentally sound innovation into widespread 
use to achieve sustainable development. In particular, universities can facilitate 
this collaboration by fostering global innovation and diffusion networks. Prizes 
that create a race for a new innovation should be mindful to take account of 
subsequent inventions building upon the initial invention. Sequential innovation 
should be encouraged in a manner that keeps important EST accessible to least 
developed countries through subsidized EST licensing or policies to keep crucial 
innovations in the public domain combined with prize or tax based incentives to 
further innovate. Future adaptive technology networks may benefit from 
universities, public and private developers placing innovations in public databases 
with sliding scale licensing arrangements based on capacity to pay, importance of 
the innovation to addressing climate change and degree to which the innovation 
relied upon publicly funded research.  
 
• Bringing patent portfolios to the pool can perhaps be best accomplished through 
university laboratories willing to engage in public domain collaborative 
innovation and diffusion of climate technologies. International climate R&D 
prizes can catalyze breakthrough innovation that should then be accessible for 
further innovation. 
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• Innovative resilience involves norm building to enhance the sharing of insights 
among international, tribal, federal, state, local, regional, NGO, civil society 
groups, and individuals. Sometimes indigenous communities have the greatest 
expertise, while in other instances transboundary water organizations can best 
implement sharing water-energy-climate responsibilities. The international 
community has expanded and can build upon its international organizational 
frameworks to bridge human rights, environment, international economic energy, 
innovation/intellectual property, water, and climate strategies into genuine 
sustainability. Taking intergenerational equity, precaution, and other codified and 
yet to be codified general principles seriously in the collaborative governance 
process likely can foster inclusive innovative resilience. Gandhi’s success was in 
his wisdom that cooperation is instrumental. Such cooperation cannot end with 
those already in agreement but must transcend deep cultural, economic, religious, 
and a range of other groupings to find shared vision and carry out shared 
solutions.  
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
 
 This article has framed environmentally sound innovation and diffusion in the 
context of transnational network theory with the goal of setting forth a preliminary 
framework for international legal policy coherence. I have asked how intra-network 
dynamics can facilitate broad diffusion of environmentally sound technologies. I 
conclude that what appears to be fragmented trade, environment, and human rights 
regimes are indeed sustainable development building blocks with which to achieve good 
governance. The technology network can incentivize collaborative creativity, coordinate 
complex, interrelated international legal spheres, and evolve locally specific solutions 
through coordinating networks that can identify and build upon best practices.  
 Countries are genuinely unsure how to address climate change without strangling 
the short-term economic growth upon which political stability depends. Drivers for 
environmentally sound innovation include reducing GHG emissions and national security. 
Challenges to transitioning to greater efficiency and renewable energy use include the 
degree to which fossil fuel is deeply embedded in the economy and the degree to which 
putting a price on carbon is a prerequisite for substantial private sector investment in 
innovation and participation in diffusion.  
 Collaborative environmentally sound innovation networking may be able to 
shepherd whole renewable energy sectors across the innovation valley of death and help 
turn a global responsibility to ramp up green technology into a global initiative to do so. 
A good starting point would be for trade and environment regimes to set clear criteria for 
what constitutes environmentally sound innovation based upon ongoing life cycle 
analysis that is mindful of science and equity. Network coordination can facilitate 
breakthroughs in trade and environment relations and build upon best practices.  	  
